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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM ~ ~ ~ 
May 25, 1978, Conference ~ ~ Q . , • 
List 1, Sheet 3 ' ~~ 
No. 77-1337-CSX 
UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA 
·v. 
HALL 
Cert to Cal. CA (Rattigan, Christian, 
Emerson) 
State/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY. This is the second cert petn arising from a lawsuit 
brought in California state court by California residents who were 
injured in an automobile accident allegedly caused by the negligent 
driving of an employee of the petr. The accident occurred in 
California. The petr contends that Nevada's sovereign immunity 
__.- .... awsz - -
should protect it from _§_uit in California courts. In the ~----- - -
alternative, it argues that the Nevada statutory limitat:ion on 
liability (Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.035; petn at xxii-xxiii) should 
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apply in the California proceedings. 
FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW. The accident on a California highway 
killed the petr's employee, inflicted permanent brain damage on 
one resp, and caused serious physical and psychological injury to 
another resp. The first resp, who was a child at the time of the 
accident, is permanently retarded and cannoL provide/ for himself. 
The resps sued the petr and the estate of the driver for damages. 
The petr moved to quash service of process on the ground; that sovereig 
immunity protected it from suit and that it had not consented to be 
sued in California courts. The trial court overruled the motion 
and the petr appealed. The Cal. S.Ct. affirmed the trial court 
judgment. 105 Cal. Rptr. 355 (1972). It sai. d that the 
State of Nevada had no rights of sovereignty over California -
citizens and therefore that the state was subject to suit to 
remedy wrongdoing that occurred in California. The court refused 
to bar the suit on the ground of federalism/ comity. It said any 
potential for embarassment to Nevada was more than outweighed by 
California's interests in highway safety and in providing a forum 
to redress wrongs agairat its citizens. This Court denied a petn 
for cert. No. 72-1449, 414 U.S. 820 (1973). 
At trial the petr moved to limit the potential damage liability 
to $25,000, the amount specified in section 41.035 at that time. 
) The trial court refused, and the jury eventually returned a verdict 
against the petr for $1,150,000. The Cal. CA affirmed. After 
recounting the history of the case, it said the only issue on 
appeal was whether the trial court had correctly refused to limit 
liability. Despite this assertion, however, the CA noted that 
the petr continued to argue that its sovereign immunity should 
- -- 3 -
• protect it from litigation altogether. The CA said further discussion 
of this contention was barred by the original decision of the Cal. 
S.Ct. The S.Ct. opinion also disposed of the argument atout the 
applicability of section 41.035, according to the CA. It said 
the petr's argument was based on the notion that the Cal. S.Ct. 
had ruled earlier that the State of Nevada had waived immunity 
to permit the suit to proceed in California. The CA said this 
misread the earlier decision, which had held that Nevada's immunity 
did not extend into California against California citizens. 
I,. Therefore, the limitation of liability statute, which in effect R was a partial waiver of sovereign immunity, was basically irrelevant. 
The CA also held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not 
require the California courts to apply the Nevada statute because the 
• Clause did not mandate extraterritoriaUapplication of statutes. 
-
5 Witkin, Summary of California Law§ 16, p. 3260 (8th ed. 1974). 
Instead, the CA said it could refuse to apply the law of another 
state where, as here, application would be contrary to California 
public policy. The Cal. S.Ct. denied a petn for cert . 
CONTENTIONS. First, the petr repeats the arguments presented 
.., -"""'- -
in its first cert petn. It contends that as a matter of federal -- ...._.. ... ----~ law a state may not be sued without its consent. Hans v. Louisiana, 
134 U.S. 1 (1890). The constitutional source of this principle is 
not clear. The primary cases on the amenability of states to 
suit are 11th amendment cases concerning suits in federal rather 
than state court. The petr is therefore left with arguments 
about the vindication of federalism generally, and about a violation 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In particular, the petr 
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(1964), in which this Court upheld federal court jurisdiction over I a state agency. The petr correctly points out that the Court found 
an implied waiver of immunity in Parden. But distinguishing that 
case does not provide a constitutirnal basis for the petr's contention 
Second, the petr contends that its sovereign immunity argument 
is important because states need the cloak of immunity outside 
their boundaries. As interstate compacts expand and intergove rnmental 
meetings proliferate, many governmental functions occur beyond 
each state's state lines. Immunity is necessary to promote the 
full and vigorous performance of these governmental duties. 
Third, the petr says the Full Faith and Credit Clause does 
require California to give effect to the Nevada statute limiting 
liability. As the CA pointed out, however, this contention proceeds 
from the assumption that Nevada is immune from suit in California 
absent any waiver. 
Fourth, the petr says the Court should hear this case because 
it is basically a conflict between two states. Nevada should not 
.have its rights finally determined in the California cr.urts; this 
Court should resolve the dispute. 
The resps also rely on arguments presented in 1973. First, 
they submit that the Court lacks jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1257(3) because no statute has been held repugnant to the United 
States Constitution. Instead, the resps see this case as one 
involving only the application of California's conflict of laws 
rules. 
Second, the resps say the petr has an unduly narrow view of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Rather than requiring t he 
application of the Nevada statute, the Clause should force Nevada 
- -- 5 -
• to give full faith and credit to tre judgment of the California 
• 1/ 
courts.- Furthermore, this Court has held that a forum state can 
ignore the legal rules of other states if those rules offend the 
public policy of the forum. Pacific Emp. Ins.Co • . v. Comm'n, 306 
U.S. 493 (1939); Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 
(1932). 
Third, the resps suggest that an implied waiver of immunity 
nonresident 
exists in this case. California has provided by statute that any/ 
motorist on California ~oads impliedly appoints the Director of 
Motor Vehicles as his agent for service of process. Cal. Veh. Code 
§ 17451. Therefore, by sending its agent to California, the petr 
accepted the conditions upon the use of California highways and 
consented to suit. In addition, Nev. Rev. Stat. § 13.025 waives 
- immunity for tort suits against the state. 
• 
DISCUSSION. The case is as certworthy today as it was in 
1973 when the pool memo recommended a grant but the Conference 
denied. Regarding that denial, it should be noted that the resps 
argued in 1973 that the decision of the Cal. S.Ct. was interlocutory 
and that review should await final judgment. Now final judgment 
the 
has occurred, imposing liabiliry upon the petr in excess of/statutory 
maximum. 
Regarding the application of sovereign immunity, the case 
seems to present an issue of first impressinn--or actually several 
---- ,,_,, 
issues: Does the Full Faith and Credit Clause require one state 
to accept the sovereign immunity asserted by a second state? Does 
1. It should be noted, however, that the resps can collect their 
judgment out of assets held by the State of Nevada, a co-petr, 
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the tenth amendment require such acceptance? How about the penumbras 
of federalism? If these questions intrigue the Conference, then 
a grant may be in order. Despite the resps' assertion to the contrary, 
the case does not appear to be limited to the question of the 
effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause on the Nevada statute 
limiting liability. The petr raised the basic sovereign immunity 
argument in the CA, and the CA resolved it on the merits by applying 
the earlier decision of the Cal. S.Ct. Furthermore, consideration 
of the limitation of liability issue could be considered to encompass 
the sovereign immunity question. Therefore, if the Conference 
would like to address the foundation of state sovereign immunity 
outside the eleventh amendrrent, the issue is presented here. 
On the other hand, the reasoning of Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. 
I~ . 
Clapper, 286 U.S. ~ (1932), supports the decision of the Cal S.Ct. 
and may have sufficiently settled the pertinent questions. There , 
a lineman died in New Hampshire while working for Bradford, a 
Vermont company. The deceased was a Vermont resident and had been 
hired in Vermont. The administratrix of the estate b Jught a 
in New Hampshire 
suit/for damages under the New Hampshire workmen's compensa tion 
statute. Bradford pleaded provisions of the Vermont comp. statute 
in defense. This Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
required application of the Vermont statute in the New Hampshire 
courts. First, the Court said that a statute can be a "public act" 
within the meani~ of the Clause. Second, the Clause requi red 
the application only of those public acts within the legis l a t i ve 
jurisdiction of the nonforum state. Third, legislative juri s di ction 
was not strictly limited by a state's boundaries. Fourth, the 
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impermissibly extra-territorial because the workmen's comp. statute 
merely created rights and liabilities between two parties, the 
company and the worker. It did not create new statutory tort liabi-
lity. 
If Bradford Electric is still good law, the question facing 
the Cal. CA was whether Nevada had legislative jurisdiction to 
implement by statute its common law sovereign immunity. In contrast 
to the relationship between Bradford and the deceased, Nevada 
had no relation.ship with the resps before the accident. Common 
? 
law sovereign immunity and the Nevada statutes do not purport to 
create rights and liabilities between individuals; they announce 
principles of general application--nonconsensual rules of law. 
They therefore would not seem to fall within Nevada's legislative 
jurisdiction when applied outside the state to a nonresident. They 
resemble laws creating general tort liability, which Bradford said 
could be imposed only within a state's territory. Therefore, the 
CaL CA correctly refused to apply the Nevada statutes. 
In summary, if the Conference thinks Bradford Electric estabiishe 
a sensible approach, the case may not be certworthy because the 
CA correctly applied Br~dford. If the Conference questions the 
reasoning of Bradford or would like to examine the area again, 
a grant may be in order because of implications of the CA holding 
for interstate relations. There is a response. 
5/16/78 Sundermeyer op1.n1.ons included; 










University and State of Ne vada v. liall , cert. 
to Calif. Sup. Ct. (Peters for a unanimous ct) 
Dec. 21, 1972, 8 C~l.3d 522; _Pet . for rehear. 
denied, Jan.24, 1973; stay of judgment granted 
pending cert, April 26, 1973. 
No. 62, Original 
Nevada v. California, Motion for Leaveto File 
Complaint, April 23, 1973. 
Timely 
-
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An automobile owned by the University of 
Nevada and being operated by an employee of the 
University was involved in a two car collision 
on a highway in California. The employee was 
acting wuthin the scope of his agency. Plaintiff 
occupants of the other car brought suit in 
the U.S. District Gourt for the Northern Distri6 
of Ca 1 if ornia and the t _lli;_San._E.i;:.a.11.c._i..s.Q..o_ .Sup_er.i or 
Court. The /fed era 1 action was not actively 
pursued, presumably for Eleventh Amendment 
reasons ("The judicial po~er of the United 
States shall not be constr.ued to extend to any 
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecute d 
against one of the United States by citizens of 
another state ... II). 
The action in the California court sought 
to recoveF damages for personal injuries. ServicE 
of process and jurisdiction was based on the 
California long arm statute dealing with motor 
vehicles . 
( _ _iiD..9 Nev ad a 
Pertinent Californialsfatutes are attache d 
to this memo. 
--






The State of Nevada, representing the 
university, moved to quash se_rvice of summons 
and complaint on grounds that California 
courts do not have jurisdiction over the 
State of Nevada and its governmental age ncies. 
The Q!Q__tLon __ was.-g r-an.ted. Plaintiffs appeal e d to 
the California Court of A_p_p_~al for the First 
District which affirmed the lower court ---------
ruling, holding that Nevada enjoyed sovereign 
immunity and had not waived it, either by 
statute or by implied consent in operating 
the vehicle in California. Plaintiffs appealed 
this ruling to the California Supreme C9urt. 
The · Court reversed . 
The Supreme Court found that Nevada was 
not exercising its sovereign power in this 
instance and therefore had no immunity unles s 
it were granted by California by law or as 
a matter of comity. "(S)tate ,sovereignty 
ends at the' state bounda ry 1 " the Court 
declo-.red, because tl).e pos sible embarrassment 
to Nevada is counterbalanced by the interes ts 
of California in sµstaining such suits. These 
j_nterests.-a re 1) the State may make and enforce 
regu]ations reasonably calculated to promote 
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2) the State must provide a forum where 
residents may se~k whatever redress is due him 
for wrongs done in California; 3) the ~tate must 
protect itself in the orderly administration of 
its laws in assuming jurisdiction over disputes 
where the&vidence is within its borders and 
where a refusal to take jurisdiction may 
result in multiple litigation; 4) the State 
I . . . 
cannot grant greater 1mmun1ty to a sister state 
than that which is bestowed upon California; and 
5) the doctrine of sovereign immunity must 
be deemed suspect when it conflicts with 
individual dignity and the role of government-as 
an instrument to secure individual rights. 
Original Action in this Court 
Subsequent to the above ruling of the 
California Supreme Court, The State of Nevada 
requested leave of this court to file a 
complaint in equity agaj_nst the State of 
California. Jurisdiction is based on Art. Ill, 
§2, cl. 2. Nevada urges that the action of the 
California court will cause immediate and irrep-
arable harm to the State of Nevada in that 
Ne~ada will be forced to defend itself outside 
its borders under threat of unlimited liability, 
in violation of its own statutes and .,decisions 
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declarin~se ve ral staes are pos s e s sed 
of sovereien immunity in courts of si s t e i 
states and that use of---~state hi~hwa ys 
by a sister state doe s not constitute con sen t 
to suit in courts of the sister state• Ne va da 
requests that California be enjoine d a nd p r o-
hibited from exercising personal jurisdiction 
over the State of Nevada. 
Contentions in No. 72-1449 (Hall) 
1) Whether the controversy raises a fed e ral 
!question as to accord this Court jurisdiction 
! 
· under 28 U,S,C. §1257(3)? 
Z) Whether the courts of one state can 
constbtutionally e xercise jurisdLction ov e r 
a sister state without its consent? 
3) Whether in this c a se Ne vada did in f a ct 
consent to suit in California's courts? 
4) Whether Ca lifornia's r e fusal to apply 
Ne vada's s t a tutory limitations of liability 
violates full faith and credit? 
Di s cuss ion of No. 72-1 44 9 
1) It would seem to me that this c o urt 









28 U.S,C. § 1257(3) in that the California 
court's ruling concerned "any title, right 
privilege or immunity ... specially set up or 
claimed under the Constitution," namely, the 
Tenth Amendment reservation to the States of 
all powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution. This tourt recently 
reaffirmed the existence of an immunity 
~reservation to the States in Employees of 
' 
Missouri v. Dept. of Health of Missouri, 41 
U.S.L.W. 4493, 4495, where the majority opinion 
by Mr. Justice Douglas stated that States may 
not easily be deprived "of an immunity they -
have long enjoyed under another part of the 
Constitutio0." A thorough discussion of 
the sovereign immunity of a State is found in 
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1889) • 
2) Aside from the suggestion in the 
Missouri case~ suora, there is little 
precedent on the status of a State appearing 
in the courts of a sister state. The cases 
relate primarily to. the immunity which states 
( -1 j.) pia.v(vj -·,0 
are granted ·· G1[-re de ral courts. The best that 
petitioner could find is Sullivan v. State of 
Sao Paulo, 122 F.2d 355 (CA2 1941) in which a 
citi zen of the United Staes sued two states in 







the situation to a suit against states of 
the American Union and held that "(i)t is 
well settled that the latter are immune from sL 
on general principles of international law in 
cases not covered by the 11th Amendme nt." 
There is a great deal of historical 
matter (e.g. Federalist papers) suggesting that 
states are immune from suit and recognizing 
the sovereignty to be accorded each of the 
states of our Union. 
The California court relied on Parden~ 
Terminal -~ Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), People 
v. Streeper, 12 Ill. 2d 204 (1957), and State 
v. Holcomb, 85 Kan. 178 (1911). To my mind, th~ 
cases are all disting uishable, Parden involve d 
the interstate operation of a State railroad. 
The Court found that the state could not be 
immune from suit under the FELA which was ena ct1 
(7J-u ~s~~--~-- ; ~-f:o__) 
- ~ngressional authori.ty to regulate 
interstate commerce. Federal supremacy counte r-
vailed ag~nst state immunity in f e deral 
courts. It might be suggested that states could 
be free from federal regulation in Pa rd e n by 
not operating in interstate commerce. The parall 
to this case is thus drawn, i.e., Nevada could 
have avoided being sub j ect to suit in 
California bj not operating motor vehicles 







that Congres s had Constitutional authority 
in Parden to abroga te stae immunity. A similar 
authority does not exist for California. Thus, 
Parde n is not all that helpful. 
The Streeper and Holcomb cases both 
c~ned property in the sister state owned 
l!!_lV -
by ;~other state. The fact that no i mmunity 
was granted is explained by the nature of the 
case. It concerned part of the corpµs, if you 
will, of the other state and is thus mater1ally 
different from the in personam power sought 
in this instance. 
Essentially, the California court 
dec ided not to accord comity to Nevada in 
the immunity area on the basis of an "interest 
analysi ·s." The interests are set forth in the 
statement of facts. Certainly, California and 
every state has a legitimate interest in 
promoting safety on its hig.l).~YE>...! The question 
· (-f-uv-thEvt=D 
is whether that interes_~ is;r - ·. by 
procedures for civil recovery or by penal laws. 
I would opt for the latter. As for the court's 
concern that its citizens have a forum to 
redress wrong s, it is noted in the briefs that 
respondents have a right of action against the 
driver of the vehicTe ( which is now pending ) and 









inconvenient, in light of the conflicting 
state interests. Cali fornia's interest- in the . 
orderly administration of its laws is an 
important one, especially since the evidence 
is largely California-related and also because 
of the chance of multiple litigation. 
It i~tant to note that the California 
~~e,_~J;Fflj 9~ "1fu. fa.if) 
court did notj: that Nev:da had by statute 
waived its immunity ( which /i' t has). The court 
found that fact immaterial in light of tts 
jview that "state sovereignty ends al:h~tate 
I ~ 
: boundary." Thus, it wo~ld appear tha t--th is 
I 
ruling stands for the bvoad proposition that 
a state court may determine the immunity status 
of another state for actions committed within 
-Pi·rtt 
the' -';\state. The ramifications for contract law 
are not inviting, at least, not without a clearer 
delineation o~ what this ruling actually means . 
It would also seem that states could in 
some instances be prejudiced. For example , if I 
were a Cali fornia juror and heard the present 
case, why not sock it to the Nevada treasury? 
It is also interesting that Nevada has a $25,000 
judgment limi tation whereas California's is 
apparently unlimited, Which law applies? Since 
the CalifoG/hia court did not go off on statutory 
grounds, Cali fornia law would presuambly apply, 
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hearing and further inquiry. 
Discussion of No. 62, Original 
The California Attorney General urges 
that equ ity is an inappropriate ground for thi! 
Court to exercise its original jurisdiction s i r 
an adequate remedy exists at law in the certior 
process. He further urges that a . showing has 
not been made of irreparable injury since the 
California court stayed its judgmen t pending 
~J~termination of certiorari. It does seem to 
me that Nevada is protected at law and is 
pursuing that remedy. Practically, I see 
... 
no difference in the cases except that 
California, which has substantial inte rests 
in the outco~e, is not represented in the 
Hall case. No doubt it could file an amicus 
brief in that case, were certiorari granted , 
Since they would then be identical, I see no 
reason for .maintaining a separate action 
under this Court's Original Jurisdiction. 
72-1449 GRANT 
62 DENY MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE COMPLAINT 
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Universitz of Nevada v. Hall--No. 77-1337 (Cert to Cal. 
Sup.Ct.) Peters, J.) 
I. FACTS 
In the spring of 1968 an employee of petitiorer, a 
state university, was driving the school's van on . official 
business in Placer County, Californi~, when the van jumped 
the median and struck respondents' auto head on. The university 
employee was killed, respondent Patricia Hall was injured, 
and John Michael, a child, sustained serious, permanent brain 
- injuries. Soon after the accident, respondents filed suit 
in California court against thee.state of the man who had been 
driving the van and the petitioners. The university and 
-
-
- - 2. 
the State were served under California's long arm statute; 
the driver's estate was served in person, as an estate proceeding 
had been cdmmenced in California. 
P~titione r moved in the California courts to quash ----.. - Cd-.s/c.f-service, arguing that Nevada's sovereign immunity barred suit ~ 
After initial success ?2',, l-M~ 
Ir.-~ 
against the state or its university. --------- ..... 
before the trial ·court, petitioner lost in the California Supreme ~~ 
not ~ Court, which ruled that a state's sovereign immunity does - - --------- -----extend beyond the state's borders. Thus, Nevada could be sued ~ 
Thi ~ outside of Nevada for actions performed outside of Nevada. 
Court denied certiorari in 1973. 
By statute Nevada has consented to be sued for tort claims 
in its own courts, but has limited its liability to $25,000 for ~ 
each incident. At the trial in the instant case, petitioner ~ -
argued that this statutory limitation of liability should  
constrain its liabi;;ty to the respondents. The California tr~ 
 
court disagreed, ruling that the statutory limitation would apply 
only · if the petitioner had been haled into California courts 
because of Nevada's partial waiver of sovereign immunity; since 
the California Supreme Court had ruled that petitioner had no 
- --
sovereign immunity protection outside of its borders, Nevada's 




The jury awarded respondents $1,150,000 in damages. · 
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's 
refusal to limit petitioner's liability to $25,000, ana the 
California Supreme Court declined to review the case further. 
This Court granted certiorari on May 25, 1978. 
II. CONTENTIONS 
Petitioner makes two basic claims. First, petitioner 
argues that sovereign immunity, a protection guaranteed by the 
tenth amendment to the Constitution, prohibits suits against a 
state unless the state has consented to suit. Petitioner asserts 
, 
- that it has not consented to the instant suit, and therefore that 
-
California's assertion of jurisdiction violated its sovereign 
immunity (and implicitly the tenth amendment). Second, 
petitioner argues that, even if it is subject to suit in 
California, the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution 
requires that California enforce the $25,000 limitation on 
~ 
Nevada's liability. Beyond this, petitioner contends that as a 
·policy matter the California courts' deci~ions will be 
disastrous, as they will undermine cooperative federalism as we 
know it. 
Respondents make three contentions in favor of 
affirmance. First, they argue that a state's sovereign immunity 
is coextensive with the state's sovereign power, and that 
sovereign power extends only to the borders of a state. Indeed, 
California's sovereign power (begat by its strong interests) in 
regulating tortious conduct on its highways precludes assertion 
- -
_of any immunity from suit for activities performed on its 
highways. Second, respondents contend that the tenth amendment 
does not embody implicitly states' sovereign immunity; rather, it 
merely reemphasizes that the federal government is limited to its 
enumerated powers. Thus, California's ruling concerning Nevada's 
immunity does not arguably conflict with the federal ~ 
constitution, and the Court is without jurisdiction under 28 -i.c...o 
u.s.c. §1257. Third, respondents argue that the full faith a ~ 
credit clause does not apply to give state legislation effect 
outside state borders. Finally, respondents reject the 
petitioners' policy arguments concerning federalism, noting that 
the only result of the California decisions will be that states 
- now will add to their insurance policies coverage for tortious 
acts of their employees performed outside of the state. 
-
III. DISCUSSION 
As I see it, petitioners' sovereign immunity claim 
involves four questions: 
A. Is the sovereign immunity claim properly before 
the Court even though certiorari was denied with 
respect to the same claim in this case in 1973? 
B. Does the full faith and credit clause require 
California courts to extend to Nevada the same 
sovereign immunity that Nevada courts recognize? --c. Does the tenth amendment (or federalism otherwise 
i mplicit in the Constitution} prohibit Californian 
courts from entertaining suit against Nevada? 
D. If the Constitution requires California to extend 
sovereign immunity to Nevada, what are the limits 




Fina, Judgment - 5. A. 
A preliminary question is whether petitioner's sovereign 
immunity challenge to California's jurisdiction is properly 
before the Court, since the same claim was raised in the previous 
petition in 1973. Although the question has not often arisen, 
the authorities that have addressed the question agree that the 
Court may consider all "substantial federal questions determined 
in the earlier stages of the litigation." Reece v. Georgia, 350 
U.S. 85, 87 (1955). 
Thus, in Mercer v. Theriot, 377 U.S. 152 (1963) (per 
curiam), a wrongful death action, the fifth circuit had reversed 
an initial ~erdict for the· plaintiffs, ordering that the case be 
remanded for dismissal unless the plaintiffs showed that on 
retrial they could present a stronger case. The plaintiffs 
sought review in this Court of the fifth circuit's initial 
decision, and certiorari was de~ied. The district court 
dismissed the remanded case, finding that additional evidence 
indicated by the plaintiffs would be inadmissible at trial. 
After the fifth circuit affirmed, this Court granted certiorari 
and considered the propriety of the original reversal, as well as 
that of the subsequent affirmance, saying that "it is settled 
that we may consider questions raised on the first appeal, as 
well as 'those that were before the Court of Appeals upon the 
second appea1 1 • 11 l 
1/ Indeed there is some room for doubt whether the California 
~upreme Court's initial judgment was final under §1257. Compare 
Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Lan~deaui 371 U.S. 555 (1963), with 
Cohen v. New York, 385 U.S. 76 ( 966)(per curiam). If the 
first ruling was not final, the instant petitionrpresents 
petitioner's sole opportunity for review by this Court of its 
sovereign immunity claim. 
-
-
A.Lcnougn cne 1...,uu:i:-L .1.11 1·1c:J..\,;c:J.. '-'..L.'-' uv ... 0 ... 0.-.. .... '"'~~t'------J \J • 
whether it c a idered the fifth circuit - first ruling to have 
been a final judgment for purposes of §1257, others have understood 
such a statement to be implicit in the Court's opinion. See 
Dyk, Supreme Court Review of Interlocutory State Court Decisions: 
"The Twilight Zone of Finality," 19 Stan. L.Rev. 907, 
930 n. 145 (1967) • Moreover, this rule makes sense, for if the 
$curt allowed petitions to review interlocutory rulings only 
-:::::-
within 90 days of the ruling, it would encourage piecemeal 
litigation and an increased deluge of certiorari petitions--no 
one would await final disposition of their entire case if they 
would thereby risk losing the opportunity to challenge various 
rulings. 
Finally,petitioners have not lost their right to assert 
sovere _ign immunity here because they did not assert it on their 
second trek through the California courts. See Urie v. Thompson, 
337 U.S. 163, 171 (1949). 
B. Full Faith and Credit 
~ ..., .-, ,,.. - -
Petitioners base their claim to sovereign immunity upon 
the tenth amendment and the constitutional penumbra of federalism 
of which that amendment is the hallmark. Before jumping into 
consideration of an amorphous penumbra and a largely unexamined 
amendment, however, it would be best first to turn to those 
provisions in the Constitution specifically addressing problems 
of the conflicting jurisdiction of the states. There are ~ e 
c Q.[!_§ titutional provisions directly concerning interstate ------- --- -- --- -- .......--- -
affairs: the interstate privileges and immunities clause of Art. 
IV, §2, the extradition clause of the same section, and the full 
faith and credit clause of Art. IV, §1. As the privileges and 
- -
_immunities and extradition clauses govern only state dealings 
with individuals and citizens, th""'ey have no application to 
'--"' 
disputes, such as the instant one, between the states 
themselves. One could argue, however (although the petitioners 
fail to do so), that the full faith and credit clause · requires 
. 
California courts to apply the Nevada law of sovereign immunity 
in cases involving the State of Nevada • 
,.. ~ 
Art. IV, §1 of the Constitution provides that, 
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and Jud i cial Proceedings of every 
other State.2 
By statute Congress has reaffirmed the command of Art. IV, §1, 
7. 
- mandating that "acts, public records and proceedings" of a state 
-
must be given full faith and credit by sister states. 28 U. ~ .C. "7 
~ .. ~ §1738. Although the statute as originally enacted did not 
include "acts," · the Court consistent l y has indicated that Art ~ 
IV, §1 is self-executing, and therefore that full faith and ~ 
credit must be extended to sister states' statutes ______,, 
~ 
as ~ ~ 
4A,.-, 
2/ As an aside, I was surprised to learn that the terms of art 
~full faith and credit" apparently originated with Chaucer. 
Thus, in the Legend of Good Women (Prologue) we find: ~ 
And as for me, though that I konne but lyte, 
On bokes for to rede I me delyte, 
And to hem yive I feyth and ful credence, 




their judgments. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial 
Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935) (reviewing under the full 
faith and credit clause the California courts' refusal to apply 
Alaskan workmen's compensation statute). 
A somewhat more difficult question, however~ is whether 
~) 
the full faith and credit clause requires the courts of one state 
to apply the common law of a sister state in some circumstances. 
Although Art. IV, ·· §1 does not mention common law decisions, the 
~ -
Court has indicated that full faith and credit must be extended ~i-.._ --to "local common law and statutory law." Magnolia Petroleum Co. 
v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 436 (1943). But see A. Ehrenzweig, A 
Treatise on the Conflict of Laws §9, at 33 n. 34 (1962) ("It seems 
- doubtful whether the dictum in Magnolia .•. can be taken as more 
than a casual remark"). The majority of commentators agree that 
common law decisions ought to be included within the scope of the 
-
-
full faith and credit clause. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig, supra, §4, 
...... 
at 9 n. 6; B. Currie, Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws, 
196 & nn. 26-29 (1963), and sources cited therein; Cheatham, 
Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 · vand.L.Rev. 581, 602-03 
(1953). As others have _ suggested, there is no reason why the 
application of a sister state's law should depend on whether the 
law is in statutory or common law form. Thus, I conclude that ---
Nevada's law of sovereign immunity should not be denied full 







h  ~,, s 
~c~rt-a~~) 
The strength of a state's obligation to apply sister ~ 
.4-<-
states' laws has been the subject of disagreement and subst~ 
confusion--both in this Court and in the secondary literature. ~c.4 
Certainly the obligation is not nearly so strict as the d~ 
to enforce final judgments of sister states' courts. See R. 
Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws, 414 & n.41 
~ 
(1971). This confusion is largely causeA by the apparent 
conflict between two lines of 
cases in which this Court has applied the full faith and credit 
clause: The first line involves claims for workmen's 
compensation where two statet)\ statutes conflict and one state 
applies its statute to the exclusion of another state which has a 
substantial interest in the case; the second line of cases 
involves claims brought in one state's courts against fraternal 
1/ Indeed, one could ar 9 ue that Nevada's law of sovereign 
immunity is statutor 1ly based. Thus, i n Nev. Rev. Stat. §41.031 /1u,-ti. 
Nevada w"a":i:'V'ed i t s s ove t~ign immunity, subject to certain 
limitations. One..of those limitations, found in Nev. Rev. Stat. 
§41.035, restricts Nevada's tort liability to $35,000 per 
incident. {The statutory limit was increased from $25,000 to 
$35,000 in 1977.) Thus, it would not strain the statutory 
language too greatly to interpret §§41.031 and 41.035 as a 
statutory reservation of sovereign immunity with respect to 
claims for more than $35,000. Such a statutory provision plainly -




organizations founded under another state's laws. In the 
reconciliation of these cases lies the standard to be applied to 
Nevada's claim for full faith and credit concerning its law of 
sovereign immunity. 
In Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 u.s. · 145 (1932), 
a resident of Vermont was employed in Vermont by a Vermont 
company. While the employee was working temporarily on his 
employer's equipment in New Hampshire, he was killed. The 
employee's executrix exercised her right under New Hampshire law 
and sued the employer for negligence. This Court ruled that the 
lower courts improperly entertained jurisdiction over the suit, 
as the law of Vermont by its terms made recovery under the 
- Vermont Workmen's Compensation Act the exclusive remedy. Justice 
Brandeis, writing for the Court, ,observed that the Vermont state 
was a "public act" and as such had to be given full faith and 
credit by New Hampshire under Art. IV, §1. The Court was careful 
to note, however, that there was no reason to believe that New 
Hampshire's application of the Vermont statute would be obnoxious 
to the public policy of New Hampshire. The rule that emerges 
from Clapper, then, is that a s~ate m~ apply a sister state's 
laws unless to do so would be obnoxious to the forum state's 
public policy--at least where the sister state has a substantial 
interest in the suit, as where its residents are involved or a 




The authority of Clapper, however, has been severely 
undermined by subsequent Court decisions. Thus, only seven years 
after Clapper the Court -decided that California constitutionally 
could refuse to apply Massachusetts' workmen's compensation law 
on facts virtually identical to those in Clapper. P~cific 
Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 
493 {1939). In doing so, the Court read liberally Justice 
Brandeis' caveat with respect to obnoxiousness to the forum 
state's public policy. Under Pacific Employers, the forum state 
may apply its workmen's compensation law to the exclusion of a 
sister state's law if the forum state's law "is the expression of 
domestic policy, in terms declared to be exclusive in its 
- application to persons and events within the state." 306 U.S., 
at 503. Since Pacific Employers •the Court routinely has allowed 
states to apply their own workmen's com~ensation laws if doing so 
will promote some significant policy of the forum state. See, 
e.g., Crider v. Zurich Insurance Co., 380 U.S. 39, 40 
-
{1965) {"Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Commission, 294 U.S. 532, and 
Pacific Employers •.. mark a breack with the Clapper philosophy"). 
The weak obligation Pacific Employers imposes upon states 
to apply their sisters' laws appears to be at odds with _the 
Court's requirement that state courts, in entertaining suits 
against fraternal organizations established under a sister 
state's law, must apply the law of the state of establishement 
rather than their own law. In .Order of United Commercial 





recent of the fraternal society cases, the Court ruled that South 
Dakota had to give full faith and credit to a constitutional 
provision of an Ohio fraternal benefit society that actions - -
against the society had to be brought within six months after the 
society's executive committee had disallowed the claim•. Although 
the six-month limitation was appropriate under Ohio law, it was 
specifically prohibited by the law of South Dakota, where the 
action against the society was brought. The basis for the 
Court's opinion that South Dakota constitutionally was compelled 
to apply Ohio law is three-told. First, the Court emphasized 
that the right being sued upon was the creation of Ohio law, as 
it depended upon the constitution of the society--a document 
plainly conceived under Ohio law. Second, the Court took great 
'--' 
pains to demonstrate that the rights of a member of the society 
were inextricably interwoven with the responsibilities of 
membership--a package defined by Ohio law. Third, the Court 
found that the interest of South Dakota in protecting its 
residents was outweighed by the interest of Ohio in assuring its 
fraternal organizations that they would not be subject to very 
·different obligations to their beneficiaries depending upon the 
latter's location. Thus, the Court concluded that South Dakota 
could not apply its own law, even though the decedent was a 
resident of anldied in South Dakota. 
The question, therefore, is how strong an interest the -forum state must have before it may disregard a sister state's 




against the interests of the forum state. There are at least 
three distinct approaches to this problem: (1) the courts could 
try to weigh the interests of the forum state against those of 
its sister; ( 2) the courts could look solely ·to the interest of 
the forum state--if it is substantial, then the law bf the forum 
constitutionally can be applied; and (3) the courts could weigh 
the interests of the forum state against the effect application 
of forum. law would have on the cooperation necessary for 
federalism to work. 
The most unsatisfact9ry of these approaches would require 
a balancing of the competing states' interests in the outcome of 
the litigation; indeed, often they have the same interest. Thus, 
- for example, in Pacific Employers Massachusetts sought to protect 
its residents by applying its wo~kmen's compensation law to its 
residents whether they were injured within or without the state. 
At the same time, California sought to protect its residents by 
applying its law to injuries occurring within its 
borders--injuries that likely would lead to medical and other 
debts owed to its residents. 
-
Beyond the difficulty of weighi~g the comp~ting states' 
interests, this approach would involve in the Court in a highly 
-
controverrsial endeavor. No state will appreciate a federal 
court deciding, for example, whether ~s protection of its 
residents is less important than a sister's protection of hers. 
- -
14. 
A second approach is suggested by Professor Currie: If 
L__ 
the forum state has a substantial interest in the dispute, it 
constitutionally may apply its own law. See B. Currie, supra, at 
188-89. Thus, Professor Currie seizes upon the liberal doctrine 
of the Court's workmen's compensation cases and extols· the 
virtues of Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Order of United 
Commercial Trave l ers. His argument that the fraternal 
organization cases are no longer the law is supported by the 
Court's long silence on the question and by its apparent 
willingness to l i mit these cases to their particular facts. See 
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 
(19-63) (Order of United Commercial Travelers "is a highly 
- specialized decision dealing with unique facts •.• "). Moreover, 
Currie's general approach has the advantage of easy application: 
-
Whether a forum state has a substantial interest in a dispute 
will, in most cases, be easily ascertainable. The drawback to 
this approach, however, is that states seldom--if ever--will be 
required to apply a sister state's laws. Such a narrow reading 
of the full faith and credit clause could subvert the very 
federalism the full faith and credit clause was meant to preserve. 
Applying Professor Currie's test to the instant case, 
there is no question but that California acied constitutionally 
in refusing to apply Nevada's sovereign immunity law. California 
residents were injured in California and required care in 
California; indeed, the boy will require care for the rest of his 
life. As Currie would not consider the competing interests of 
- -
another state, California's substantial interest in the Halls' 
suit justifies the refusal to apply Nevada law. 
15. 
The third approach to giving sister states' laws full 
faith and credit would require that states apply other states' 
laws only where applying the forum's laws would do substantially 
more damage to cooperative federalism than applying the sister's 
laws would do to the forum's public policy. See R. Weintraub, 
Supra, at 408-19. Professor Weintraub argues that the workmen's 
compensation ca..ses are entirely consistent with the fraternal 
organizations cases if one focuses on the extent to which 
application of the forum's laws would im~pair the federal 
'--
scheme. Thus, for example, the effect on Massachusetts workmen's 
- compensatio~ system is minimal if the system is not extended to 
cover accidents occurring outside the state; the heart of the 
system--coverage of Massachusetts residents for accidents 
occurring in Massachusetts--is left intact. A~ing states to 
impose disparate obligations on fraternal benefits organizations, 
on the other hand, might frustrate Ohio's desire to allow such 
o~ganizations to exist. 4 
-
4/ One difficulty with Professor Weintraub's theory is its 
failure to explain why the Court has allowed application of the 
forum state's law to regular insurance company contracts-~that 
is, why the impact on federalism is different with respect to 
insurance companies than it is with respect to fraternal 
organizations. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., 
377 U.S. 179 {1963} {Florida can apply Florida law to insurance 
policy bought by Illinois resident in Illinois}. Professor 
Weintraub's only attempt to reconcile the fraternal benefit cases 
with other cases involving insurance contracts is his suggestion 




Professor Weintraub's approach has the advantage of giving 
federalism the protection envisioned by those who drafted the 
full faith and credit clause; its disadvantage is the difficulty 
the courts would have in using the approach. 
Applying this third approach to the instant case, one must 
weigh the extent of California's interest in protecting its 
residents (both the respondents who were injured by the 
petitioner's agent's acts and those who have had to provide 
medical and other services ~o the respondents and to petitioner's 
agent) against the extent to which our federal fabric would be 
torn if California were allowed to hold Nevada accountable. 
- California's interest is powerful: A California resident was 
-
- - -injured on a California highway and will continue to require care 
indefinitely in California. California's interest in this 
dispute is stronger than that presented in any of the numerous 
cases in which the Court has allowed a state to apply its own 
law. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955) {Missouri 
resident employed in Missouri is injured in Arkansas and allowed 
to collect qnder Arkansas law). California's entertaining of 
this suit, on the other hand, does not pose a serious threat to 
~ - . ----- --- ---------------
"Ou E,__Fed~raJ ism." It is easy to imagine cases in which unbridled 
> 
suit against sister states seriously would disrupt governmental 
functions. This is not such a case, however. The California 
Supreme Court ruling limited its courts' jurisdiction to suits 
involving actions of a sister state outside her borders. 
- -
Nevada's liability for acts of its agents performed entirely 
outside of her borders is unlikely seriously to interfere with 
Nevada's ability to carry on her business. As the respondents 
argue, the actual result of the California Supreme Court's c._..._ ____ _ 
holding is that states will increase their insus ance ' tb cover 
such liability. 5 
17. 
In sum, I conclude ' that--whether Professor Currie or 
Professor Weintraub is correct concerning the scope of full faith 
and credit--California is not constitutionally required to give 
,__ - -----
full faith and credit to Nevada's law of sovereign immunity 
- ~ ---------------- ~ ~ 
merely because Nevada is a party to the action. As California 
has a substantial public interest in the respondents' case and 
- entertainment of such suits as this is not likely seriously to 
damage the federal fabric of our nation, California was 
constit~tionally entitled to apply its own law, which denies 
states immunity from tort liability.~} 
5/ Of course, the clear implication of my analysis is that, if 
Professor Weintraub is correct concerning the content of the full 
faith and credit clause, then there w~ll be cases in which one 
state will have to defer to a sister state's law of sovereign 
immunity. Specifically, states will have to defer to others' 
immunity where entertainment of the suit is likely seriously to 
disrupt a sister's functioning as a separate sovereign. Cf. 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
Sa/ Annot. Calif. Codes--Gov't §815.2 provides that public 
a entities shall be liable for tort injuries such as those involved 
W here. As this provision applies to California subdivisions, there 
is no difficulty here with California applying to a sister 




C. Tenth Amendment 
Petitioners argue that the tenth amendment forbids 
California to allow its courts to adjudicate Nevada's tort 
liability. Petitioners correctly point out that the Constitution 
does not specifically authorize suit against a state: ·on the 
other hand, however, they can point to no specific prohibition on 
such suits. Rather, petitioners claim that immunity from suit in 
a sister state's courts was one of the rights enjoyed by the 
states at the time of the drafting of the Constitution i n 1789. 
Thus, they invoke the tenth _amendment, which provides that, 
Powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited 
by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people. 
In effect, petitioners argue that this constitutional reservation 
of states' powers made constitutional the states' right not to be 
sued in a sister states' courts. Respondents, on the other hand, 
argue that California's interest as a sovereign in giving relief 
for injuries inflicted on its residents within its borders allows 
it to adjudicate Nevada's liability. 
1. History of Sovereign Immunity 
There is some indication that at the ~ime the Constitution 
was framed states were immune from suit in sister states' 
courts. Thus, in Nathan v. Virginia, 1 U.S. {l Dall.) 77 {Ct. of 
Common Pleas, Philadelphia County 1781), the Supreme Executive 
Council of Pennsylvania quashed the attachment of property 
- belonging to Virginia, ruling that Virginia was immune from suit 
- -
19. 
in Pennsylvania courts. It is impossible to know what weight to 
give this ruling, however, as it was based upon a long-outdated 
aspect of the "law of natTbris" and assumed a degree of 
sovereignty for individual states that likely is at odds with the 
Constitution as adopted eight years later. 
Some of the Framers argued that states were immune from 
suit. Thus, in t he Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton claimed 
that no state could be sued in either state or federal court 
without its consent. See The Federalist No. 81, at 455 (1826) (A. 
Hamilton). Similarly, John . Marshall urged during the Virginia 
debates on ratification that it was irrational "to suppose that 
the sovereign power should be dragged before a court." J. 
e Elliot, Debates 555 (1836). See also id. at 533 (James Madison's 
similar argument). Each of these affirmations of sovereign 
immunity, however, was made during the d~fense of Art. III, §2, 
which extended the federal judicial power to controversies 
between a state and citizens of another state. Thus, the 
Framers' arguments, though broad in their terms, were directed 
toward convincing an audience that in federal court states could 
sue but never could be sued. 
-
It- is difficult, then, to find a definitive statement 
concerning the right of states not to be sued in sister state 
courts as of the time the Constitution was drafted. Thiis 
largely due, no doubt, to the uniform refusal of states to assert 
jurisdiction over their sisters. Whether this refusal is 





h_owever, or to the difficulty of enforcing judgments once 
entered, is impossible to discern. Moreover, even if there was a 
generally perceived right of sovereign immunity.before 1789, the 
ceding of some sovereignty incident to joining the Union may have 
altered that right. 
Petitioners also attempt to use general language in 
opinions of this Court to establish that there is a generally 
recognized constitutional right of sovereign immunity. Close 
examination of these cases, however, reveals that each dealt with 
suit against a state in fed~ral court--something that is 
explicitly forbidden by the eleventh amendment. See, e.g., 
Parden v. Terminal -Railroad of Alabama Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 
(1964). So far as I can tell, it has never been suggested that 
the plain language of the eleventh amendment should be strained 
so as to forbid suits against the states in state courts. See 
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity 
Doctrines: Part One, 126 Pa.L.Rev. 515, 546-49 (1978), semble. 
In one case the Court did suggest that state courts would be 
without power to consider a state's claim for escheat of 
•intangibles. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania, 
368 U.S. 71, 80 (1961}. The Court's suggestion, however, was 
dictum, and may have been prompted by a belief that the dispute 
actually was between two states and therefore properly the 
subject of the Court's original jurisdiction. 
- -
2. Application of National League of Cities v. Usery 
to Interstate Disputes 
21. 
Assuming that the states enjoyed the right in 1789 not to 
be sued in the courts of a sister state, there is nonetheless 
good reason not to extend the tenth amendment · to presarve this 
right. Prior to 1976, most commentators believed that the tenth -amendment had no substantive content whatsoever--that it did no 
more than re-emphasize that ours is a federal government of 
enumerated powers. Indeed, the Court itself had said as much. 
See United States v. Darby, _312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). In 1976, 
however, the Court in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 
U.S. 833 (1976) struck down a federal statute imposing minimum 
- wage and maximum hours limitations on state governments. In 
doing so, the Court stated that hhe tenth amendment prohibits 
such interference with a state's conduct of its affairs as would 
substantially impair the state's sovereign integrity or would 
allow the destruction of the state as a sovereign entity. Thus, 
it appears that the tenth amendment, beyond limiting the federal 
government's powers to those expressly given, also gives 
aftirmative protection against destruction of the sovereignty of 
th individual states. 
-
Petitioners would have us believe that the tenth 
amendment, as interpreted in National League of Cities, prohibits 
California from exercising jurisdiction over Nevada, because 
otherwise Nevada's essential go::).,ernmental operations would be 
substantially interfered with. There are two difficulties with 
- -this argument. First, National League of Cities dealt solely 
with Congressional intrusion into the affairs of the states; 
nowhere in the opinion did the Court intimate that the tenth 
amendment should extend to interstate rivalries as well. This 
limitation is well founded in the history of _ the tenth 
amendment. The national debate from which the amendment arose 
centered solely upon the concern of some that the federal 
government constitutionally could usurp the powers of the 
states. See, e.g., 3 J. Elliot, Debates 449-50 (2d ed. 
22. 
1836) (delegates to Virginia ratification convention express 
concern over the lack of a "clause declaring expressly that every 
power and right not given up was retained by the s~ates"). 
Similarly, Justice Story unequivocally opined that the tenth 
- amendment's sole concern was with delimiting the powers of the 
federal government vis a vis the states. See 2 J. Story, 
Comment_aries on the Constitution §§1907-08. 
-
Second, even if National League of Cities extends to 
interstate affairs, there is no reason to believe that the 
tenth amendment's limitation on interference in state affairs 
depends upon the stat~s' rights against interference in 1789. 
Thus, the Court's opinion in National League of Cities,does not 
look to states' rights when the Constitution was framed. 
Rather, the Court opined that the tepth amendment's content 
is determined by what interference would undermine substantially 
a state's ability to operate as an independent sovereign. 
Third, and most important, the tenth amendment should 
not b~ federal/state disputes because, as 
I have already argued, there~ cific clauses in the Constitutio 





is correct that 
interests in cooperative federalism must be taken into account in 
applying the full faith and credit clause, then states would have 
to apply their sisters' sovereign immunity law in cases 
jeopardizing the federal system. Thus, the very same interests 
are protected by the full faith and credit clause as would be 
protected under the petitioners' expanded view of the tenth 
amendment. Where there is a specific constitutional provision 
dealing with a problem, I would not stretch an amorphous 
provision to do the same. 
**** 
In a nutshell, then, I would reach the question 
of sovereign immunity, rule that the judgment below passes 
constitutional muster under the full faith and credit, and 
rule that the tenth amendment is inapplicable in cases such 
as this. 6 
11/3/78 David 
\ 
6/ At the outset I posed a fourth question: What limitations 
would be imposed upon California's authority to hale 
Nevada into its courts? I can see no grounds for distinguishing 
between the fact of sovereign immunity and the scope of 
sovereign immunity. Thus, if Nevada is not constitutionally 
entitled to avoid any liability in California, I see nothing 
in the Constitution entitling it to limit its liability. 
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California, a California court has entered a judgment against ~  
the State of Nevada that Nevada's own courts could not have J 
entered. We granted certiorari to decide whether federal law ~ 
prohibits the California courts from entering such a judgment , _ 77 ,1 . . . · . 
or, indeed, from asserting any jurisdiction over another sover- U/~ ~
eign State. /? ..,L ~~, • 
The respondents are California residents. They suffered I.A,'",,,.~~ 
severe injuries in an automoble collision on a California high-
way on May 13, 1968. The driver of the other vehicle, an 
employee of the University of Nevada, was killed in the colli-
sion. It is conceded that he was driving a car owned by the 
State, that he was engaged in official business, and that the 
UnivP-rsity is an instrumentality of the State itself. 
~-~ 
10~-Respondents filed this suit for damages in the Superior 
Court for the City of San Francisco, naming the adminis- J J ~ 
trator of the driver's estate, the University, and the State of Y- { .A., 
fovada as defendants. Process was served on the State and ~ 'M--f 
the University pursuant to the provisions of the California , - ~ /J .. 
Code authorizing service of process on nonresident motorists.1 
1 Section 17451 of the California Code provides: ~~ 
''The . acceptan:e by a nonresident o'. the rigl'.ts and privileges conferred .- //1,_ ~ ~-
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The trial court granted a motion to quash service on the 
State, but its order was reversed on appeal The California 
Supreme Court held , as a matter of California law, that the 
State of Nevada was amenable to suit in California courts and 
remanded the case for trial. Hall v. University of Nevada, 8 
Cal. 3d 5~2, 503 P. 2d 1363. We denied certiorari. 414 U.S. 
820; 
On remand, Nevada filed a pretrial motion to limit the 
amount of damages that might be recovered. A Nevada 
statute places a limit of $25,000 on any award in a tort action 
aga.inst the State pursuant to its statutory waiver of sovereign 
immunity.2 Nevada argued t~at the Full Faith anq Credit 
vehicle anywhere within this state, or in the event, the nonresident is the 
owner of a motor vehicle then b~· the operation of the vehicle anywhere 
within this state by any person with his express or implied permission, is 
equivalent to an appointment by the nonresident of the director or his 
successor in office to be his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be 
served all lawfu1 processes in any action or proceeding against the non-
resident operator or nonresident owner growing out of any accident or 
collision resulting from the operation of any motor vehicle anywhere within 
this state by himself or agent, which appointment shall abo be irrevocable 
and binding upon his executor or- administrator." Cal. Code § 17451 
(West 1971) . 
An admini,,;trator of the decedent 's estate was appointed in California and 
was served personally. 
2 Nevada Revised Statutes 41.035 (1) as it existed in 1968, found in official 
edition, Statutes of Nevada 1955, p. 1414, [later amended by Statutes of 
Nevada 1968, p. 44, Statutes of Nevada 1973, 1532, and Statutes of 
Nevada 1977, '985, 1539} : 
'' 1. No award for damages in an action sounding in tort brought under-
NRS 41.031 may exceed the sum of $25,000 to or for t'he benefit of any 
claimant. No such award may include any amount as exemplary or-
punitive damages or as interest prior to judgment ." 
Nevada Revised Statutes 41.031, found in official edition, Statutes of Ne-
vada, 1965, p. 1413, as amended by Statutes of Nevada, 1975, 209, 421 and 
Statutes of Nevada 1977, 275 : 
" 1. The State of Nevada hereby waives its immunity from liability and 
iction and hereby consents to have its liability determined in accordance 
- -
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Clause of the United States Constitution 3 required the Cali• 
fornia courts to enforce tha.t statute. Nevada's motion was 
denied, and the case went to trial. 
The jury concluded tha.t the Nevada driver was negligent 
and awarded damages of $1,150,000.4 The Superior Court 
entered judgment on the verdict and the Court of Appeal 
affirmed. After the California Supreme Court denied review, 
the State of Nevada and its University successfully sought a 
writ of certiorari. - U. S.-. 
Despite its importance, the question whether a State may 
claim immunity from suit in the courts of another State 
with the same rules of law as are applied to civil actions against natural 
persons and corporations, except ?S otherwise provided in NRS 41.032 to 
41.038, inclusive, and subsection 3 of this section, if the claimant complies 
with the limitations of NRS 41.032 to 41.036, inclusive, or the limitations 
of the NRS 41.010. The State of Nevada further waives the immunity 
from liability and action of all political subdivisions of the state, and their 
liability shall be determirn?d in the same maimer, except as otherwise pro-
vided in NRS 41.032 to 41.038, inclusive, and subsection 3 of this section, 
if the claimant complies with the limitations of NRS 41.032 to 41.036, 
inclusive. 
"2. An action may be brought under this section, in a court, of competent 
jurisdiction of this state, against the State of Nevada, any agency of the 
state, or any political subdivision of the state. In an action against the 
state or any agency of the state, the State of Nevada, shall be named as, 
defendant, and the summon~ and a copy of the complaint shaU be served 
upon the secretar~, of lltate." 
8 Article IV, § 1 provides: 
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
Records, and judicial Proceedings o,f every other State. And the Congress 
may be genera] Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Efft-ct thereof." 
4 The evidencP indicated that respondent, John Hall, a minor at the time 
of the accident, sustained srvere head i1i'juries resulting in permanent brain 
damage wl11cl1 left him ~pverrly retarded and unable to care for hilllSelf, 
and that. respondent, Patricia Hall, his mother,, suffered ~evere physical 
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has never been addressed by this Court. The question is not 
expressly answered by any pr(?vision of the Constitution; 
Nevada argues that it is implicitly answered by reference to 
the common understanding that no sovereign is amenable to 
suit without its consent--an understanding preva.lent when 
the Constitution was frame<l and repeatedly reflected in this 
Court's opinions. In order to determine whether that under-
standing is embodied in the Constitution, as Nevada cla.ims," 
it is necessary to consider (I) the source and scope of the tra-
ditional doctrine of sovereign immunity; (2) the impact of 
the doctrine on the framing of the Constitution; (3) the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause; and ( 4) other aspects of the Con-
stitution that qualify the sovereignty of the several States. 
I 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is an amalgam of_~ 
quite different conce,Rts. one applicable to suits in the sover-
e,ign's ~ 1 courts and the other to suits in the courts of 
another sovereign. 
The immunity of a truly inuependent sovereign from suit 
in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute 
right for centuries. Only the sovereign's own consent could 
qualify the absolute character of that immunity. 
The doctrine, as it developed at common law, had its origins 
in the feudal system. Describing those origins, Pollock and 
Maitland noted that no lord could be sued by a vassal in his 
own court. but each petty lord was subject to suit in the 
courts of a higher lord. Since tbe King was at the apex of 
the feudal pyramid, there was no higher court in which he 
" Xo one claims that any federal statute places an)· relevant restriction 
on California',-; juri»diction or lends any support to Nevada's claim of 
irnnrnnit?, If there is n federal rule that re:;trict:,; California';, exerci;,e 
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could be sued.(; The King's immunity rested primarily on the 
structure of the feudal system and secondarily on a fiction 
that the King could do no wrong. 7 
We must, of course, reject the fiction . It was rejected by 
the colonists when they declared their independence from the 
'Crown,8 and the record in this case discloses an actual wrong 
committed by Nevada. But the notion that immunity from JI- , ✓ ~ 
suit is an ~ttribut~ f sovereignty is reflected in our cases. LA.-,, u,.~~L.t. 
Cbief Justice Jay described sovereignty as the "right to 
govern"; 1' that kind of right would necessarily encompass the 
right to determine what suits may be brought in the sover-
eign's own courts. Thus, Justice Holmes explained sovereign 
immunity as based "on the logical and practical ground that 
6 See 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of English Law 518 (2d ed. 
1898) ("He can not be compelled to arnswer in his own court, but this is 
true of ever petty lord of every petty manor; that there ha ppen1, to be in 
this world no court above his court is, we may say, an accident."); 
Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 
44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 2-5 (1972). 
7 See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 239 
(1765) ("The .king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, but of 
thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing.") In fact, 
however, effective mechani~ms developed ea.rly in England to redress 
injuries resulting from the wrongs of the King. See Jaffe, Suits Agaim,t 
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3-'5 
(1963) . 
8 The Declaration of Independence provides: 
"That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these 
ends, it i;, the Right of the People to alter or t,o abolish it, and to institute 
new Government ... and 1,uch is now the necessity which constrains them 
to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present 
King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all 
having in direct object the e::Jtablishment of an absolute Tyranny over 
these States." 
See generally B. Bailyn, The Ideological OrigillS of the American Revolu-
tion 198-229 (1967) . 
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there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes 
the law on which the right depends." 10 
This explanation adequately supports the conclusion that 
no sovereign may be sued in its QW courts without its con-
sent, but it afforcls no support ior a claim of immunity jn 
another sovere1g1Tscourts. Such a claim necessarily impli-
cates tfie power ana authority of a second sovereign; its source 
must be found either in an agreement, express or implied, 
between the two sovereigns. or in the voluntary decision of 
the second to -respect the dignity of the first as a matter of 
comity. 
This point was plainly stated by Chief Justice Marshall in 
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, which 
held that an American court could not assert jurisdiction over 
a vessel in which Napoleon , the reigning emperor of France, 
claimed a sovereign right. In that case, The Chief Justice 
observed : 
"The jurisdiction of courts is a branch of that which 
is possessed by the nation as an · independent sovereign 
power. 
"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory 
-is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible 
of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction 
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would 
imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the 
restriction , and an investment of that sovereignty to the 
same extent in that power which could impose such 
restriction. 
" All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete 
power of a nation within its own territories, must be 
traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can 
flow from no other legitimate source." 7 Cranch 116~ 
rn6. 
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After noting that the source of any immunity for the French 
vessel must be found in American law, The Chief Justice 
interpreted that law as recognizing the common usage among 
nations in which every sovereign was understood to have 
waived its exclusive territorial jurisdiction over visiting sov-
ereigns. or their representatives, in certain classes of cases.11 
The opinion in The Schooner Exchange makes clear that if 
California and Nevada were independent and completely so; -
ereign 11ations, Nevacta's claim of immunit from suit in 
California's courts wou e answere by reference to the law 
o(California.12 It is fair to infer that if the u nmunity defense -
11 The opinion describe,- the exemption of the per;;on of t he sovereign 
from arrest or detention in a foreign territory, the immunity allowed to· 
foreign ministrr::;, Rnd thr pRssage of troops through l\ country with its 
permission. 7 Cranch , nt 137- 140. 
12 As an independent :sovereign Nevada might choose to withdraw its 
nione~· from California banks, or to readjust its own rule:; as to Ca1ifornia's 
amenabilit~· to ,mit in the ~evada courts. And it might refuse to allow 
thi::: judgment to be enforced in its courts. But it could not, absent Cali-
fornia 's corn,ent and absent whatever protection is conferred by the United 
StR.t e:; Constitution. invoke an~· higher authority to enforce rules of inter-
state comity and to stop California from asserting jurisdiction. For to do 
so would be wholl~· at odds with the sovereignty of California. 
'.13 The State:,:' practice of waiving sovereign immunity in their own 
cou rts is a relative[~- recent development; it was only last year, for exam-
ple, that Pe1111s~·lvania concluded that the defense would no longer be rec-
ognized. at lea:;t i11 certain circumstances, in that State. Act. No. 1978-
152, H . B. No. 2437, § 42 Pa. C. S. A. §§ 5101 , 5110 (Sept. 28, 1978). 
But as States have begun to waive their right:s to immunity in their own 
courts, it wa::; only to be expected that the privilege of immunity afforded 
to other States as a matter of comity would be subj ect to question . 
Similar!~·, as concern for redress of individual injuries has enhanced, so 
too have moves to\vard the reappraisa l of the practices of sovereign 
nations according absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns. The govern-
ing rule today, in many nations , is one of restrictive rather than absolute 
immunity. See 26 Dept . State Bull. 984 (1952); Note, The .Jurisdictional 
Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 Yale L . .J. 1148 (1954) ; Mareniak, 
H all v. Nevada: Stat•e Court .Jurisdiction Over Sister States v. Americalf 
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Nevada asserts today had been raised in 1812 when The 
Schooner Exchange was decided, or earlier when the Consti-
tution was being framed. the defense would have been sus-
tained by the California courts.13 By rejecting the defense in 
this very case. however, the California courts have told us that 
whatever California law may have been in the past, it no 
1~immunity to Nevacta as a matter of comi~ 
Nevada does not ask us to review the Califo rnia courts' 
interpretation of California law. Rather, it argues that Cali-
fornia is not free . as a sovereign, to apply its own law, but is 
Bound instead by a federal rule of'law implicit in the Consti-
tution that requires al1 of the States to adhere to the sover~ 
eign immunity doctrine as it prevailed when the Constitution 
was adopted. Unless such a federal rule exists, we of course 
have no power to disturb the judgment of the California cou!t, 
II 
Unquestionably the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a 
matter of importance in the early days of independence.:14 
Many of the States were heavi1y indebted as a result of t)re 
Revolutionary War. ·· They were vitally interested in the ques-
tion whether the creation of a new federal sovereign, with 
courts of its own , would aut-Omatically subject them, like 
lower English lords, to su1ts in ' the courts of the "higher" 
sovereign. 
But the question whether one State might be subject to 
suit in the courts of another State was apparently not a mat-
ter of concern when the new Constitution was being dra.fted 
and ratified. Regardless of whether the Framers were correct 
111 assumfog, as presumably they did, that prevailing notions 
of comity would provide adequate protection against the 
u nlikely prospect of an attempt by the courts of one State to 
l 1 See general!~- C. Jacob:i, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign 
I mmunity 1-40 (1972) . 
111 
~~ 
~~ tf?..,(./,• t '~ 
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assert jurisdiction over another, the n~ r constitutional -
p~ection against that contingency was not discussed~~ ~ik-vv--
The debate abolitthe suab"ility of the States focussed on the 
scope of the judicial power of the United States authorized 
by Art. 111.'5 In The Federalist, Hamilton took the position 
that this authorization did not extend to suits brought by an 
individual against a nonconsenting State.16 The contrary 
position was also advocated '7 and actually prevailed in this 
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419. 
The Chisholm decision led to the prompt adoption of the 
15 Article III provides, in relevant part: 
"Section 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress ma.y from 
time to time ordain and establish .. . . 
"Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under thi:; Con:;titution, the Laws of the United States, 
and Treatie:; made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ... to 
Controver:;ied to which the United States shall be a Party ;-to Controver-
sied between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of 
another Sta.te;-between Citizen;:; of different States;-between Citizens 
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects." 
rn The Federali:;t No. 81, p. 547 (Heritage Pres;,; 1945) (A. Hamilton) 
("[it] i:; inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the 
suit of an individual without its consent"); see 2 J. Elliot, The Debates in 
the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitu-
tion 555 (John Marshall) ("I hope that no gentleman will think that a 
state will be called at the bar of the federal court . . . . The intent is to 
enable statrs to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. I 
contend thi:; constmction is warranted by the words." ) Id., at 533 (James-
Madi:;on) . 
17 Sre 2 id .. at 491 (James Wilson). ("When a citizen has a controversy 
with another :,tate, therr ought to be a tribunal where both parties may 
stand on a just and equal footing."); C. Jacobs, supra, at 40 ("the legis-
lative history of the Constitution 11ardly warrants the conclusion drawn 
by some that therP was a grneral understanding, at the time of ratification,, 
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Eleventh Amendment.18 That Amendment . places explicit ----------------limits on the powers of federal courts to entertain suits against 
a State.l.9 The doctrine that no State may be sued without 
its consent led this Court to enlarge those limits by holding 
that the States' immunity from suit in a federal court extends 
to suits brought by their own citizens,2° by a federal corpora-
tion,21 or by a foreign state.22 
The language used by the Court in these cases, like the 
language used during the debates on ratification of the Con-
stitution, emphasized the widespread acceptance of the view 
that a sovereign State is never amenable to suit without its 
consent.23 But all of these cases, and all of the relevant 
18 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 11 ; Mcmaco v. Mississippi, 292 
U. S. 313, 325. 
19 The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution provides: 
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend 
io any suit in law or equity, commenced ilf prosecuted against one of the 
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State." 
Even as so limited, however, the Eleventh Amendment has not accorded 
the States absolute sovereign immunity in federal court actions. The 
States are subject to suit by both their sister States and the United States. 
See, e.g., North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365,372; United States v. 
Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140-141. Further, prospective injunctive and 
380 U. S. 128, 140-141. Further, prospective iniunctive and declaratory 
relief is available · agairnst States in slufsii?tederal court in which state 
officials are the nominal defendants. See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123; 
E~ i_ Y. J~, 415 U. S. 651. See generaHy Baker, Federalism and 
the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. Colo: L. Rev. 139 (1977) . 
20 Hans v. Louisiana, supra. In the Hans opinion, the Court recognized 
that the Eleventh Amendment "did not in term1s prohibit suits by individ-
trals against the States," but declared "that the Constitution should not be 
construed to import any power to authorize the bringing of such suits." 
134 U.S., at 11. 
21 Smith v. Reeves;"178 U. S. 436. 
22 Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313. 
23 See, e. g. , Hans v. Louisiana, supra, at 18 ("The :state courts have no 
power to entertain suit;, by individual:s against a state without its consent. 
- -
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debate, concerned questions of federal court jurisdiction and 
the extent to which the States, by ratifying the Constitution 
and creating federal courts, had authorized suits against them~ 
selves in those courts. These decisions do not answer the 
question whether the Constitution places any limit on the 
exercise of one's State's power to authorize its courts to assert 
jurisdiction over another State. Nor does anything in Art. III 
authorizing the judicial power of the United States, or in the 
Eleventh Amendment limitation on that power, provide any 
basis, explicit or implicit, for this Court to impose limits on ~zt[: J 
the powers of California exercised in this case. A mandate for 1,u ~ ,~ 
fe c;!_eral court ~~ent of interstate comity must find i~ ~ 1 ./ 
basis elsewhere in the Constitution. 
17
f ' r.-~ 
&-faeJ . ~ 
III ~  
Nevada claims that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the  
Constitution requires California to respect the limitations on 
Nevada's statutory waiver of its immunity from suit. That 
waiver only gives Nevada's consent to suits in its own courts. 
Moreover. even if the waiver is treated as a consent to be 
sued in California, California must honor the condition at-
t ached to that consent and limit respondent's recovery to 
$25,000, the maximum a1lowable in an action in Nevada's 
courts. 
The Full Faith ~ 1d C~ dit Clause dQ.f_s require each State to ) 
give eff~ cial actscTotlier States. A judgment entered 
in one State must be respected in another provided that the 
first State had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter. Moreover, in certain limited situa.tions, the courts of 
one State must apply statutory Taw crt"'" another State. 'Thus, 
-======-------- --------------
T hen how doe:; the circuit court , having only concurrent jurisdiction, 
acquire any such power?' ' ) ; Monaco v. Mississippi, supra. at 322-323 
("There is also the postulate that States of the Union , still possessing 
attribntes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suit;;, without their con-
sent , save where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan 
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in Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145. the Court 
. held that a federal court sitting in New Hampshire was 
required by the Constitution to apply Vermont law in an 
action between a Vermont employee and a Vermont employer 
arising out of a. contract made in Vermont. 2~ But this Court's 
decision in P<y;.'if!:!:...!!!'!Y'rance Comp::ny v. Industrial Accident 
Commission, 306 U. S. 493, clearly establishes that the Fall 
Faith and Credit Clause does not reqmre a State to apply 
an~erStiite's law in vioi'ation ot its own legitimate public 
policy.2 5 
. Th~ question in . Pacific · Insurance was whether the Full 
Faith and Credit ·clause precluded California from applying 
its own workmen's compensation· -act in the case of an injury 
suffered by a Massachusetts employee of a Massachusetts 
employer while in California in the course of his employment. 
'Even though the employer and employee had agreed to be 
bound by Massachusetts'law, this Court held that California 
was not precluded from applying its own law imposing greater 
responsibilities on the ·employer. In doing so, the ·Court 
reasoned : 
"It has often been recognized by this Court that there are 
some limitations upon the extent to which a state may be 
required by the foll faith and credit clause to enforce 
even the ,1udgment of another state in contravention of 
24 Justice Stone concurred in the Clapper decision, expressing the view 
that the result was supported by the conflict of law rule that a New 
Hampshire court conld be expected to apply in this situation, and that. 
it was unnecessary to rely on the Constitution to stlpport the Court's 
judgment . He also made it clear that the rule of the case did not encom-
pass an action in which the source of the relationship was not a Vermont 
contract between a Vermont employer and a Vermont employee. 286· 
U . S., at 163-165. 
is See also Alaska Packers Assn. v. Cornm'n, 294 U. S. 532 ; Bonaparte v. 
Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 (holding that a law exempting certain bonds of 
the enacting State from taxation did not apply extra.t·erritorially by virtu~-
Qf the Full Faith and Credit Clause) . 
- -
i'i-1337-0PINION 
UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA v. HALL 13 
its own statutes or policy . . . . And in the case of 
statutes, the extrastate effect of which Congress has not 
prescribed, as it may under the constitutional provision, 
we think the conclusion is unavoidable that the full faith 
and credit clause does not require one sta.te to substitute 
for its own statute, applicable to persons and events 
within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even 
though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of 
the state of its enactment with respect to the same per-
sons and events . . . . Although Massachusetts has -an 
interest in safeguarding the compensation of Massachu-
setts employees while temporarily abroad in the course 
of their employment, and may adopt that policy for itself, 
that could hardly be thought to support an application of 
the full faith and credit clause which would override the 
constitutional authority of ' another state to legislate for 
the bodily safety and economic protection of employees 
injured within it. Few matters could be deemed more 
appropriately the concern of the state in which the injury 
occurs or more completely within its power." 306 U. S., 
at 502-503. 
The Clapper case was distinguished, and limited to its facts, 
on the ground that "thete was nothing in the New Hampshire 
statute, the decisions of its courts, or in the circumstances of 
the case, to suggest that reliance on the provisions of the 
Vermont statute, as a defense to the New Hampshire suit, was 
obnoxious to the policy of New Hampshire." Id., at 504.?<S 
2,; Justice, Stone wT10 had concurred separately in Clapper, see n. 24, 
supra. wrote for the Court in Pacific Insurance. After distinguishing 
Clapper, he limited its holding to its facts : 
''The Clapper case cannot be :;aid to have decided more than that a state 
~tatut e applicable to employer and employee within the state, which by 
1ts term,; provide:; compensation for the employee if he is injured in the 
!'OUr;.:e of his employment while temporarily in another state, will be given 
full faith and credit in the latter when not obnoxiotIB to its policy." 306 
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In Pacific Insurance, on the other hand. California had its 
own scheme governing compensation for injuries in the State, 
and the Calif qrnia courts had found that the policy of that 
scheme would be frustrated were it denied enforcement. 
('Full faith and credit." this Court concluded. "does not here 
enable one state to legislate for the other or to pr-oject its laws· 
across state lines so as to preclude the other from prescribing 
for itself the legal consequence of acts within it." Id., at 
504-505. 
A similar conclusion is appropriate in this case. The inter-
est of California afforded such respect in the Pacific Insurance 
case was in providing for "the bodily .safety and economic 
protection of employees in,iured within it;" Id., at 503. · In 
this case, California's interest is the closely related and equally 
substantiai"'"one of provicfing "full protection to those who are 
injurea onil:s hlg'fiways tlirough the negligence of both resi-
dents and no11residents." Hall v. University of Nevada 
( appencTix t;o"petitio;-;_t 7). ' To effectuate this interest, Cali-> 
fornia has provided by statute for jurisdiction in its courts 
over residents and nonresidents alike to allow those injured on 
its highways through the negligence of others to secure full 
compensation for their injuries in the California courts. 
In further implementation of that policy, California has 
unequivocally waived its own immunity from liability for the 
torts c01nmittectby its own a.gents and autiiorized full recovery 
eyen again~ sovereign. As the California courts have 
found , to require California either to surrender jurisdiction 
or to limit Tespondents' recovery to the $25,000 maximum of 
the Nevada statute would be obnoxious to its statutorily based 
policies of jurisdiction over nonresident motorists and fult 
recovery. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require, 
this result. 
IV 
Even apart from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Nevada 
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which the States are not free to treat each other as unfriendly 
sovereigns. but must respect the sovereignty of one another. 
While sovereign nations are frre to levy discriminatory taxes 
on the goods of other nations or to bar their entry altogether, 
the States of the Union are not.21 Nor are the States free 
to deny extradition of a fugitive when a proper demand is 
made by the Executive of another State.28 And the citizens 
in each State are entitled to all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several States. 2 ~ 
Each of these provisions places a specific limitation on the 
sovereignty of the several States. Collectively they demon-
strate that ours is not a union of 50 independent sovereigns. 
But these provisions do not imply tha.t any one State's immu-
nity from suit in the courts of another State is anything other 
than a matter of comity. Indeed, in view of the Tenth 
Amendment's reminder that powers not delegated to the Fed-
eral Government nor prohibited to the States are reserved to 
the States or to the people / 0 the existence of express limita-
tions on state sovereignty may equally imply that no unstated 
limitations on state power were intended by tbe Framers. 
In the past, this Court has presumed that the States in-
tended to adopt policies of broad comity towards one another. 
But this presumption reflected an understanding of state 
E_oliJ Y, rather than ~ titutional com~ nd. As this Court 
stated in Bank o f Augusta v. ""E"arle, 13 Peters 519, 590: 
"The intimate union of these states, as members of the 
same great political family; the deep and vital interests 
27 See U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8. 
" 8 Id .. Art. IV, § 2. 
"" Ibid. 
3" The Tenth Amendment to the United States Con:,;titution provide;;: 
'•'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Const.itution, nor 
prohibited by it to the State;;, are reserved to the States re;,pectively, or 
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·which bind them so closely together; should lead us, in 
the absenc0, of proof to the contrary. to presume a greater 
degree of comity. and friendship, and kindness towards 
one another. than we should be authorized to presume 
between foreign nations. And when (as without doubt 
must occasionally ·happen) the interest or pe>licy of any 
state requires it to restrict the rule, it has but to declare 
its will. and the legal presumptiori is at once at an end." 
In this case. California has "declared its will"; it has adopted 
aslts])olicy full compensation rn the courts of its State for 
in.iuries on its highways resulting from the negligence of 
others, ,,vhether those others be residents or nonresidents, 
agents of the State or private citizens. Nothing in the Fed- ) 
eral Constitution authorizes or obligates this Court to frus-
trate that policy out of enforced respect for the sovereignty of 
Nevada.31 
In this Nation each sovereign governs only with the con-
sent of the governed. · The people of Nevada have consented 
to a system in which their State is subject only to limited 
liability in tort. But the people of California, who have ha<l 
no voice in Nevada's decision. have adopted a different sys-
tem. Eacb of these decisions is equally en titled to our respect. 
vVhether it is wise policy, as a matter of harmonious inter-
state relations. for States to accord each other immunity or 
to respect any established limits on liability. is ultimately a 
matter for the States themselves. or for Congress to decide. 
In the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a fed-
eral court ma no reqmre a11y ate to mo 1 y its ownlegit-
imate po 1cies. Indeed. i a ederal court were to 10ld, by-
inferenc;' fro7i'1 the structure of our Constitution and nothing 
31 Cf. Georgia Y. Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472, 480 ("Land acquired by 
oue State in another State is held :;ubject to the laws of the latter and to 
all incidents of private ownership. The proprieta ry right of the owning-
St:ite does not re:;trict or rnodif~· the power of eminent domain of tT1C'· 
Staile· \\lliere the land is situated •. ") •. 
- -
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else, that California is not free in this case to enforce its policy 
of full compensation, that holding would constitute the real 
intrusion on the sovereignty of the States-and the power of 
the people-in our Union. 
The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is affirmed, 
- -~u:prttttt (!} ilUrl itf iltt ~ b .§fa.ug 
'J.i a,g' ~ 18. (!}. 20.;r )I. .;l 
CHAM BERS 0 1=" 
JUST ICE POTTER STEWART 
J anuary 15, 1979 
Re : No. 77 -133 7 - un•ive rsity of Nevada v. Hal l 
Dear John: 
I am glad to join your op i nion for the 
Court. 
Mr. Justice Ste v e n s 
Copie s to t h e Co n f e rence 
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Memorandum 
To: Justice Powell 
Re: Proposed Footnote in Univ. Nevada v. Hall 
I would consider adding the following footnote after 
"recovery." on page 14, line 31: 
/ •california's exercise of jurisdiction in this 
case poses no substantial threat to our constitutional 
system of cooperative federalism: ! t: ia-4-i ffj c ult _to
21
-
~ imaRiae now$ uits involving traffic accidents 
. t~ I,. ~=.~ 
occurring outside of Nevada could; interfere wi~ 
Nevada's A~/o~ ~+~=-~-,, , 
,/.Pv~> 
express no view as to whether a state could entertain 
I\ 
suits against a sister state with respect to 
sovereign acts taken within the sister state's 
borders. See R. Weintraub, Commentary on the Cnnflict 
of Laws, 408-19 (1971).d, 
The Weintraub citation is taken from my bench memo; the library 




To: Justice Powell 
-
Re: Justice Stevens' opinion in Nevada v~ Hall 
The sole concern I have concerning Justice Stevens' 
opinion is with pp 13-14. As we have discussed, I think it is 
quite proper for California to entertain suits against Nevada 
with respect to auto accidents occurring on California 
highways. Justice Stevens concludes that this is so because 
California has a "substantial" (p. 14) and " l egitimate" (P. 16) 
interest in such matters. I do not question the substantialitv 
and legitimacy of California's inte~est. My concern, howe v er, 
is that there may be some cases in which one state might have a 
su_b_s_t_a_n-:--t ~i--a~i~--a~?i°-::d-~~m:7e interest in disputes involving 
............. ...____ ......,, IIIU' - -
sovereign acts of sister states. Thus, for example, California ----------may have a legitimate interest in the manner in which Nevada 
develops its public lands. To allow California residents to 
sue the State of Nevada with respect to such matters in 
California courts, however, could pose a substantial threat to 
our federal scheme. 
The concern I am setting fo r th may be too speculative 
to deserve addressing in this opinion. Nonetheless, as I 
described in my bench memorandum to you, I would prefer to say 
./ 
; - -
that California acted within its constitutional riqhts in this -case because California's substantial interest in the subject --matter of the suit was not plainly overshadowed by the threat 
~
such lawsuits pose to our federal fabric. A standard Phrased 
- - ' - " 
in such language would leave the Court an "out" if in some 
fut~re case it is apparent that a state's actions are likely to 
lead to judicial warfare amonq the states. If you were to 
agree with the point I make here, it is oossible that it could 
be accomodated in a footnote inserted at the end of the last 
full sentence on paqe 14 (iust before roman numeral four). The 
footnote could say that we do not here consider whether the 
entertaining of some suits aqainst sister states miqht be so 
obnoxious to our scheme of federalism that it could not be 
justified even by a substantial, leqitimate state interest. 
1/15/79 David 
- -
Januury 16, 1979 
77-1337 University of Nevada v . Hall 
Dear John: 
In a separate note, I am ioininq your opinion in 
the above case . 
It is a fine opinion, and 1 am happy to ioin it. 
I <lo have one sugqestion that perhaos you will consider . As 
you suqq~st, comity among thP stat~s should prPvent our 
decision in this casP. from producinq reciprocal-tyne 
litigation o~ questions more closPly relat~d to state 
sovereignty than a tort action . It is difficult to foresee 
the tvpes of situations that mav ~rise . I would th~refore 
be hapoier if vour opinion had some sort of caveat. 
~ossi~ly a footnote nlonq the followina lines 
would serve this puroose: 
•calif0rnia'R exercisA of iurisdiction in this case 
Poses no substantial t~r~at to our constitutional 
system of cooperative federalism . Suits involving 
traffic accidents occurring outside of Nevada could 
hardly interfer~ with Nevada ' s capacity to fulfil 
its own sovereign responsibilities . There may be 
situqtions where this could result from a suit in 
the courts of another. state . We express no view, 
~ for €xamole, as to whether a state could entertain 
suits 3qainst a sister state with respect to 
m sovereiqn acts taken within the sister state's 
borders . See R. Weintraub, Comm~ntary on the 
Conflict of Laws, 408-19 {1971) . • 
Sincerely , 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
- • 
January 16 , 1979 
77- 1337 University of Nevada v . Hall 
near John : 
Please join me . 
Mr . Justice StPvens 
lfp/ ss 
cc : The Conference 
Sincerely , 
• 
C HAMBE RS OF 
-
J;.ttpt'tmt Qiamt ttf lltt 'J!tttilt~ J;mtts 
JlmrJringhm. J. QI. 2llffe'!, 
J U S TI C E JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
Re: 77-1337 - University of Nevada v. Hall 
Dear Lewis: 
Would the following new n. 27 at the end of 
Part III on page 14 take care of your concern? 
"27/ California's exercise of jurisdiction 
inthis case poses no substantial threat to 
our constitutional system of cooperative 
federalism. Suits involving traffic 
accidents occurring outside of Nevada could 
hardly interfere with Nevada's capacity to 
fulfill its own sovereign responsibilities. 
We have no occasion, in this case, to con-
sider whether different state policies, 
either of California or of Nevada, might 
require a different analysis or a different 
result. See R. Weintraub, Commentary on the 
Conflict of Laws, 408-410 (1971)." 
Res7:ry, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
✓ 
mo: 
'12P, 7 ,#>, '/ 15 
4t-~, ~~ ' Mr. Ur. 
Chief Justice 
Just I C9 Br' 1·'19."' 
Justice Ste.·u..rt 
Just loe Wh'l. te 
Just 1 oe 'tli{a.raha 11 
Mr. Justice Bla.-,lc:iun 
Mr. Juat1ce Po-vell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
~\'z 
From: Kr . Justice Stevens 
Circulated: _____ _ 
Recirculated: JAM 1 g 19 
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 77-1337 
University of Nevada et al. )On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Petitioners, Court of Appeal of Califor-
V o nia, First Appellate Dis-
John Michael Hall, Etc., et al. trict. ,. 
[January -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this tort action arising out of an automoble collision in. 
California, a California court has entered a judgment against 
the State of Nevada that Nevada's own courts could not have 
entered. We granted certiorari to decide whether federal law 
prohibits the California courts from entering such a judgment 
or, indeed, from asserting any jurisdiction over another sover-
eign State. 
The respondents are California residents. They suffered 
severe injuries in an automoble collision on a California high-
way on May 13, 1968. The driver of the other vehicle, an 
employee of the University of Nevada, wa$· killed in the colli-
sion. It is conceded that he was driving a car owned by the 
State, that he was engaged in official business, and that the 
University is an instrumentality of the State itself. 
Respondents filed this suit for damages in the Superior 
Court for the City of San Francisco, naming the adminis-
trator of the driver's estate, the University, and the State of 
Nevada as defendants. Process was served on the State and 
the University pursuant to the provisions of the California 
Code authorizing service of process on nonresident motorists.
1 
' Section 17451 of the California. Code provides : 
"T11c acreptance by a nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred 
upon him by this code or any operation by himself or agent of a motor 
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The trial court granted a motion to quash service on the 
State, but its order was reversed on appeal. The California 
Supreme Court held, as a matter of California law, that the 
State of Nevada was amenable to suit in California courts and 
remanded the case for trial. Hall v. Un-iversity of Nevada, 8 
Cal. 3d 522, 503 P. 2,d 1363. We denied certiorari. 414 U.S. 
820; 
On remand, Nevada filed a pretrial motion to limit the 
amount of damages that .might be recovered. A Nevada 
statute places a limit of$25,000 on any award in a tort action 
against the State pursuant to its statutory waiver of sovereign 
immunity.2 Nevada argued that the Full Faith and Cr--edit 
vehiclr anywhere within this state, or in the event the nonresident is the 
owner of a motor vehicle then by the operation of the vehicle anywhere 
within this state by any person with his express or implied permission, is 
equivalent to an appointment by the nonresident of the director or his 
uccessor in office to bt> his true and lawful attorney upon whom may be 
served all lawful processes in any action or proceeding against the non-
resident operator or nonresident owner growing out of any accident, or 
collision resulting from the operation of any motor vehicle anywhere withh1 
this state b~· him,;elf or agent, which appointment shall also be irrevocable 
and binding upon his executor or administrator." Cal. Code - § 17451 
(West 1971) . 
An administrator of the decedent 's estate was appointed in California and 
was served personally. · 
2 Nevada Revised Statutrs 41.035 (1) as it existed in 1968, found in official 
edition , Statutes of Nevada 1965, p. 1414, [later amended by Statutes of 
Nevada 1968, p. 44, Statutes of Nevada 1973, 1532, and Statutes of 
Nevada 1977, 985, 1539]: 
" 1. No award for damages in an action sounding in tort brought under 
NRS 41.031 may exceed the sum of $25,000 to or for t.he benefit of any 
claimant. No such award may include any amount as exemplary or 
punitive damages or as interest prior to judgmt-nt." 
N<•rnda Revised Statutes 41.031, found in official edition, Statutes of Ne-
vada, 1965, p. 1413, a~ amrnded by Statutes of Nevada, 1975, 209, 421 .and 
Statutes of Nevada 1977, 2i5 : 
«1. The State of Nevada hereby waives its immunity from liability and 
-action and hereby consents to have its liability determined in accordaJJce 
- -
77-1337-0PINION 
UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA v. HALL 3 
Clause of the United States Constitution 3 required the Cali .. 
fornia courts to enforce that statute. Nevada's motion was 
denied, and the case went to trial. 
The jury concluded _ that ~e Nevada driver was negligent 
and awarded damages of $1,150,000.4 The Superior Court 
entered judgment on the verdict and the Court of Appeal 
affirmed. After the California Supreme Court denied review, 
the State of Nevada and its University successfully sought a 
writ of certiorari. - U. S. - . 
Despite its importance, the question whether a State may 
claim immunity from suit in the courts of another State 
with the same rules of law as are applied to civil actions agaim;t natural 
person:; and corporations, except as otherwise provided in NRS 41.032 to 
41.038, inclusive, and ::mbsection 3 of this section, if the claimant complies 
with the limitations of NRS 41.032 to 41.036, inclusive. or the limitations 
of the NRS 41.010. The State of Nevada further waives the immunity 
from liability and action of all political subdivi:;ions of the state, and their 
liability shall be determined in the same manner, except as otherwise pro-
vided in KRS 41.032 to 41.038, inclu,,ive, and subsection 3 of this sect ion, 
if the claimant, complies with the limitations of NRS 41.032 to 41.036, 
inclusive. 
"2. An action may be brought under this section, in a court of competent 
jurisdiction of this state, against the State of Nevada, any agency of the 
state, or any political sti°bdivision of the state. In an action against the 
state or any agency of ihe state, the State of Nevada. shall be named as, 
defendant, and the summons and a copy of the complaint shall be served 
upon the secretary of 1,tate." 
3 Article IV, § 1 provides : 
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, 
·Records, and judicial Proceedings of every otl)er State. And the Congres!! 
·may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effoct thereof." 
4 The evidence indicated that respondent, John Hall, a minor at the time 
_ of the accident, sustained severe head in,juries resiilti-ng in permanent brain 
damage which left him ~everely retarded and unable to care for himself, 
·and that respondent, Patricia Hall, his mother, suffered severe physical 
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has never been addressed by this Court. The question is not 
expressly answered by any provision of the Constitution; 
Nevada argues that it is implicitly answered by reference to 
the common understanding that no sovereign is amenable to 
suit without its consent--an understanding prevalent when 
the Constitution was framed and repeatedly reflected in this 
Court's opinions. In order to determine whether that under-
standing is embodied in the Constitution, as Nevada claims,5 
it is necessary to consider (-1) the source and scope of the tra-
ditional doctrine of sovereign immunity; (2) the impact of 
the doctrine on the framing of the Constitution; (3) the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause; and ( 4) other aspects of the Coo~ 
stitution that qualify the sovereignty of the several State_s. 
I 
· The doctrine of sovereign· immunity is an amalgam of two 
quite different concepts, one applicable to suits in the sover-
eign's own courts and the other to suits in the courts of 
· another sovereign. 
The immunity of a tru1y independent sovereign from suit 
in its own courts has been enjoyed as a matter of absolute 
-right for centuries. Only the sovereign's own consent could 
qualify the abso1ute character of that immunity. 
The doctrine, as it developed at common law, had its origins 
in the feudal system. Describing those origins, Pollock and 
Maitland noted that no lord could be sued by a vassal in his 
own court, but each petty lord was subject to suit in the 
courts of a higher lord. Since the King was at the apex of 
the feudal pyramid, there was no higher .court in ·which he 
5 No one claims that any federal statute places any relevant restriction 
on California's jurisdiction or lends any support to Nevada's claim of 
immunity. If there is a federal rule that restrict,; California's exercise 
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could be sued.6 The King's immunity rested primarily on the 
structure of the feudal system and secondarily on a fiction 
that the King could do no wrong.7 
We must, of course, reject the fiction. It was rejected by 
the colonists when they declared their independence from the 
Crown ,8 and the record in this case discloses an actual wrong 
committed by Nevada. But the notion that immunity from 
suit is an attribute of sovereignty is reflected in our cases. 
Chief Justice Jay described sovereignty as the "right to 
govern"; !) that kind of right would necessarily encompass the 
right to determine what suits may be br_ought in the sover-
eign's own courts. Thus, Justice Holmes explained sovereign 
immunity as based "on the logical and practical ground that 
6 See 1 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of English Law 518 (2d ed. 
1898) ("He can not be c0mpelled to answer in his own court , but this is 
true of ever petty lord of every petty manor; that there happens to be in 
this world no court above his court is, we may say, an accident.") ; 
Engdahl , Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 
44 U. Colo. L. Rev.1,2-5 (1972) . 
7 See 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 239 
(1765) ("The king, moreover, is not only incapable of doing wrong, qut of 
thinking wrong: he can never mean to do an improper thing.") In fact, 
howewr, effective mechanbrru; developed ea rly in England to redress 
injuries resulting from the wrongs of the King. See Jaffe, Suits Against 
Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3-5 
(1963) . 
8 The Declaration of Independence proclaims: 
"That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these 
ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute 
new Government ... and such is now the necessit.y w-hich constrains them 
to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present 
King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all 
having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over 
these States." 
See generally B. Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of t he American Revolu-
tion 198-229 ( 1967) . 
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there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes 
the law on which the right depends." 10 
This explanation adequately supports the conclusion that 
no sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its con-
sent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in 
another sovereign's courts. Such a daim necessarily impli-
cates the power and authority of a secorid sovereign; its source 
must be found either in an agreement, express or implied, 
between the two sovereigns. or in the voluntary decision of 
the second to respect the dignity of the first as a matter of 
comity. 
This point was plainly stated by 'Chief Justice Marshall in 
The Schooner Exchange v. M cFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, which 
held that an American court could not assert jurisdiction over 
a vessel in which ~apoleon. the reigning emperor of France, 
claimed a sovereign right. · In that case, The Chief Justice 
'observed : 
"The jurisdiction of courts is-a branch of that which 
is possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign 
power. 
"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory 
is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible 
of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restriction 
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would 
imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the 
restriction , and an investment of that sovereignty to the 
same extent in that power which could impose such 
restriction. 
" All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete 
power of a nation within its own territories, must be 
traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can 
flow from no other legitimate source." TCranch 116,. 
136. 
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After noting that the source of any immunity for the French 
vessel must be found ill American law, The Chief Justice 
interpreted that law as recognizing the common usage among 
nations in which every sovereign was understood to have 
waived its exclusive territorial jurisdiction over visiting sov-
ereigHs, or their representatives, in certain classes of cases.11 
The opinion in The Schooner Exchange makes clear that if 
California and ~evacla were independent and completely sov-
ereign nations. Nevada's claim of immunity from suit in 
California's courts would be answered by reference to the law 
of C'alifornia.12 It is fair to infer that if the immunity defense 
11 ThP opinion de~cribes the exemption of the person of the sowreign 
from arrest or detention in a foreign territory, the immunity allowed to· 
foreigu minister::; , and the passage of troops through a country with its 
permis;:ion . 7 Cranch. at 137-140. 
3 2 WNP it an independent ::;overeig11 Nevada might choose to withdraw iL,; 
mane!· from California banks, or to readjust its 0W11 rules as to Ca1ifornia's 
amenability to suit in thr Nevada courts . And it might refuse to allow 
thi~ Judgment to be enforced in its courts. But it could not, absent Cali-
fornia '~ consent and absent whatever protection is conferred by the United 
State::; Con,,titution . invoke any higher authority to enforce rule;; of inter-
state comit~· and to ,;top California from as::;e rting jurisdiction. For to do 
so would be wholl~· at odd~ with the sovereignty of California. 
'1 3 The State;:' practice of waiving sovereign immunity in their own 
courts is a relatively recent development; it was on]~, last year, for exam-
ple, that Penns~·lvania concluded that t he defense would no longer be rec-
ognized, at lea:,;t in certain ci rcumst nces, in that State. See Mayle "· 
Pennsyluauia. 888 A. 2d 709 (Pa. 1978); Act. No. 1978-152, § 42 Pa. 
C. S. A. §§ 5101. 5110 (Sept. 28, 1978). Bur as State~ have begun to 
" ·ain' t hC'1r nght~ to immunit~· in their own courts, it was only to be 
expected that the privilege of immunit y afforded to orher State;; as a 
matter of com it~· would be subject to question . 
Similar]~·. as concern for redress of individual injuries has enhanced, so 
too have' moves toward the reappraisal of the practices of sovereign 
nation" according ab,;olute immunity to foreign sovereigns. The govern-
ing rule today, in many nations, is one of restrictive rather than absolute 
immunity. See 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952) ; Note, The Jurisdictional 
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Nevada asserts today had been raised in 1812 when The 
Schooner Exchange was decided, or earlier when the Consti-
tution was being framed, the defense would have been sus-
tained by the California courts.13 By rejecting the defense in 
this very case, however, the California courts have told us that 
whatever California law may have been in the past, it no 
longer extends immunity to Nevada as a matter of comity. 
Nevada quite rightly does not ask us to review the Cali-
fornia courts' interpretation of California law. Rather. it 
argues that California is not free. as a sovereign. to apply its 
own law. but is bound instead by a federal rule of law implicit 
in the Constitution that requires all of the States to adhere to 
the sovereign immunity doctrine as it prevailed when the 
Constitution was adopted. Unless such a federal rule exists. 
we of course have no power to disturb the judgment of the· 
California court. 
II 
Unquestionably the doctrine of sovereign immunity was a 
matter of importance in the ear1y days of independence.14 
Many of the States were heavily indebted as a result of the 
Revolutionary ,Var. They were vital1y interested in the ques-
tion whether the creation of a new federal sovereign, with 
courts of its own. would au·tomatica1ly subject them, like 
lower English lords. to suits in the courts of the "higher" 
sovereign. 
But the question whether one State might be subject to 
suit in the courts of another State was appaTently not a mat-
ter of concern when the new Constitution was being drafted 
and ratified. Regardless of whether the Framers were correct 
hi assuming, as presumably they did. that prevailing notions 
of comity would provide adequate protection against the 
Hall v. Nevada : Sta te Co11rt. -.Tnrif:diction Over Sister State:; v. American 
Sta.te Sovereign Immunity, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 1144, 1155-1157 (1975). 
~-~ ~ee general])' C. Jacobs, The Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign 
;Immunity 1-40 (1972) . 
- -
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unlikely prospect of an attempt by the courts of one State to 
assert jurisdiction over another, the need for constitutional 
protection against that contingency was not discussed. 
The debate about the suability of the States focussed on the 
scope of the judicial power of the United States authorized 
by Art. III.15 In The Federalist. Hamilton took the position 
that this authorization did not extend to suits brought by an 
individual against a no11consenting State_-i., The contrary 
position was also advocated 1.1 and actually prevailed in this 
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419. 
The Chisholm decision led to the prompt adoption of the 
15 Article III provides, in relevant part: 
"Section 1. The judicial r>ower of the United States, shall be vested in 
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from 
time to time ordain and establish .... 
"Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and 
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, 
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority ... to 
Controversied to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controver-
sied between two Or more States;-between a State and Citizens of 
another State;-between Citizens of different Sta.tes;-between Citiz·ens 
of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and 
between a State, or the Citizen,; thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects." 
16 The Federalist No. 81, p. 547 (Heritage Press 1945) (A. Hamilton) 
("[it] is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the 
uit of an individual without its· consent"); see 2 J. Ellmt, The Debates in 
1,he Several State Convention:; on the Adoption of the Federal Constitu-
tion 555 (John ~farshall) ("I hope that no gentleman will think that a 
state will be called at the bar of the federal court . . . . The intent is to 
enable state,; to recover claims of individuals residing in other states. I 
contend this construction is warranted by the words.") Id., at 533 (James 
Madison) . 
17 See 2 id., at 491 (James Wilson). ('"When a citizen has a controversy 
with another state. there ought to be a. tribunal where both parties may 
;;tand on a ju8t and equal footing."); C. Jacobs, supra, at 40 ("the legi:s-
la t1ve history of the Constitution hardly warrants the conclusion drawn 
by some that there was a general understanding, at the time of ratification, 





Eleventh Amendment.18 That Amendment places explicit ) n~ 
limits on the powers of federal courts to entertain suits against ~ 
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a State. 19 
The language used by the Court in cases construing these l 
limits, like the language used during the debates on ratifica-
tion of the Constitution , emphasized the widespread accept-
ance of the view that a sovereign State is never amenable to 
suit without its conseut_io But all of these cases, and all of 
the relevant debate. concerned questions of federal court juris-
diction and the extent to which the States, by ratifying the 
Constitution and creating federal .courts. had authorized suits 
against themselves in those courts. These decisions do not 
answer the question whether the Constitution places any 
18 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 11 ; Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 
U. S. 313, 325. 
19 The E leventh Amendment to the Constitution provides : 
"The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend 
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or protiecuted against one of the 
United States by Citi,zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State." 
Even as so limited, however, the Eleventh Amendment has not accorded 
the States absolute sovereign immunity in federal court actions. The 
States are subject to suit by both their sititer States and the United States. 
See, e. IJ .. North Dakota v. Minnesota, -263-U. S. "365,"'372 ; United States v. 
Mississippi, 380 U. S. 128, 140-141. Further, prospective injunction and 
declaratory relief i:; available against States in suits in foderal court in 
which state officials are the nominal defendants. See Ex parte Young, 209 
U. S. 123; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651. See generally Baker, Fed-
era lism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. Colo. L. R ev. 139 (1977). 
20 Sec, e. g., Hans Y . Louisiana. supra, at 18 (''The state courts have no 
power to _entertain suits by individuals against a state without its consent. 
Then how does the ci rcuit court, having only concurrent jurisdiction, 
acquire any such power?") ; Monaco v. Mississippi, supra. at 322-323 
("There 1s also the postulate that States of the Union , oitill prn,sessing 
tLttributes of sovereignty, :shall be immune from suits, without their con-
sent, save where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan 
of the 'convention.'") . 
- -
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limit on the exercise of one's State's power to authorize its 
courts to assert jurisdiction over another State. Nor does 
anything in Art. III authorizing the judicial power of the 
United States, or in the Eleventh Amendmeut limitation on 
that power, provide any basis, explicit or implicit. for this 
Court to impose limits on the powers of California exercised 
in this case. A mandate for federal court enforcement of 
interstate comity must find its basis elsewhere in the 
Cons ti tu tion. 
III 
Nevada claims that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
Constitution requires California to respect the limitations on 
Nevada's statutory waiver of its immunity from suit. That 
waiver only gives Nevada's consent to suits in its own courts. 
Moreover, even if the waiver is treated as a consent to be 
sued in California, California must honor the condition at-
tached to that consent and limit respondent's recovery to 
$25,000, the maximum allowable in an action in Nevada's 
courts. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does require each State to 
give effect to official acts of other States. A judgment entered 
in one State must be respected in another provided that the 
first State had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject 
matter. Moreover, in certain limited situations, the courts of 
one State must apply statutory law of another State. Thus, 
in Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145. the Court 
held that a federal court sitting in New Hampshire was 
required by the Constitution to apply Vermont law in an 
action between a Vermont employee and a Vermont employer 
arising out of a contract made in Vermont. 21 But this Court's 
21 ,Ju~ticr Stonr concurred in the Clapper deci~ion, expressing the virw 
that the re,,ult was supported by the conflict of law rule that a New 
Hampshire court could be expected to apply in this situation, and that 
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decision in Pacific Insurance Company v. Industria.l AcC'ident 
Commission, 306 U. S. 493. clearly establishes that the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause does not require a State to apply 
another State's law in violation of its own legitimate public 
policy.2 2 
The question in Pacific Insurance was whether the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause precluded California from applying 
its own workmen's compensation act in the case of an injury 
suffered by a Massachusetts employee of a Massachusetts 
employer while in California in the course of his employment. 
Even though the employer and employee had agreed to be 
bound by Massachusetts · raw, this Court held that California 
was not precluded from applying its ow11 law imposing greater 
responsibilities on the employer. In doing so, the Court 
·reasoned : 
"lt has of ten been recognized by this Court tha.t there are 
ome limitations upon the extent to which a state may be 
required by the full faith an·d credit clause to enforce 
even the judgment of another· state in contravention of 
its own statutes or policy . . . . And in the case of 
statutes, the extrastate effect of-which Congress has not 
prescribed, as it may under the constitutional provision. 
we think the conclusion is unavoidable that the full faith 
and credit clause does not require one state to substitute 
for its own statute, applicable to persons and events 
within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even 
though that statute is of controlling force· in the courts of 
f udgment. He also made it clear that the rule of the case did not encom-
pas:; an action in which the source of the relation:;hip was not a Vermont 
cont ract between a Vermont employer and a. Vermont employee. 286 
U S., at 163-165. 
"" See abo Alaska Packer8 Assn.\'. Comm'n. 294 U.S. 53:2; Bonaparte "· 
Tax Court , 104 U. S. 592 (holding that a law exempting certain bonds of 
the enacting St.ate from taxation did not apply extraterritorially by virtue 
d the Full Faith and Credii Clause) 
- -
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the state of its enactment with respect to the same per-
sons and events . . . . Although Massachusetts has an 
interest in safeguarding the compensation of Massachu-
setts employees while temporarily abroad in the course 
of their employment, and ma.y adopt that policy for itself, 
that could hardly be thought to support an applica.tion of 
the full faith and credit clause which would override the 
constitutional authority of another state to legislate for 
the bodily safety and economic protection of employees 
injured within it. Few matters could be deemed more 
appropriately the concern of the state in which the injury 
occurs or more completely within its power." 306 U. S., 
at 502-503. 
The Clapper case was distinguished on the ground that 
"there was nothing in the New Hampshire statute, the deci-
sions of its courts. or in the circumstances of the case, to 
suggest that reliance on the provisions of the Vermont statute. 
as a defense to the Kew Hampshire suit. was obnoxious to the 
policy of Kew Hampshire." Id., at 504.t" In Pacific Insur-
ance, on the other hand, California had its own scheme 
governing compensation for injuries in the State, and the 
California courts had found that the policy of that scheme 
would be frustrated were-it denied enforcement. "Full faith 
and credit." this Co.urt concluded. "does not here enable one 
state to legislate for the other or to project its laws across 
state lines so as to preclude the other from prescribing for 
itself the legal consequence of acts within it.'' Id. , at 504-505. 
"" .lustier Stone who had "Oncurred ,;eparately in Clapper. ;,ee n. 24, 
8UJ!l"O. \\Tote for the Comt in Pacific lnS'urance. After distinguishing 
Clapper, he limited its holding to it,; fact:; : 
" Tht· Clapper ra,;e cannot be :-:aid to have dPcidPd more than that a state 
stah1t<' applicable to Pmplo~·er and employee within thP :state, which by 
it~ term,; provide:- rompen:;arion for the Pmployee if he i,; injured in the 
cour:-:P of his employment while temporarily in another :sta.tP, will be given 
full faith and credit in the liltter when not o"bnoxiow, to its policy." 300 
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A similar conclusion is appropriate in this case. The inter-
est of California afforded such respect in the Pacific Insurance 
case was in providing for "the bodily safety and economic 
protection of employees injured within it." Id., at 503. In 
this case, California's interest is the closely related and equally 
substantial one of providing "full protection to those who are 
injured on its highways through the negligence of both resi-
dents and nonresidents." Hall v. University of Nevada 
( appendix to petition at 7). To effectuate this interest, Cali-) 
fornia has provided by statute for jurisdiction in its courts 
over residents and nonresidents alike to allow those injured on 
its highways through the negligence of others to secure full 
compensation for their injuries in the California courts. 
In further implementation of that policy, California has 
unequivocally waived its own immunity from liability for the 
torts committed by its own a.gents and authorized full recovery 
even against· the sovereign. As the California courts have 
found , to require California either to surrender jurisdiction 
or to limit respondents' recovery to the $25,000 maximum of 
the Nevada statute would be obnoxious to its statutorily based 
policies of jurisdiction over nonresident motorists and full 
recovery. The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require 
this resul t.24 
IV 
Even apart from the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Nevada 
argues that thB Constitution implicitly establishes a Union in 
which the States are not free to treat each other as unfriendly 
sovereigos. but must respect the sovereignty of one another. 
24 Ca lifornia \ ; exerci::;e of jurisdiction in this case po:ses no substantia l 
threat to our constitutional system of cooperative federalism. Suits in-
volvmg traffic accident:.; occurring outside of ~evada could hardly inter-
lrre with ~evada ';; capacitr to fulfill iti:! own sovrreign responsibilitie;,_ 
We have no occasion, in this case, to consider whethr r different state poli-
cies, either of Ca lifornia or of Nevada, might require a different ana l~·sis 
ur a '<lifft>rent resnlL 
- -
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vVhile sovereign nations are free to levy discriminatory taxes 
on the goods of other nations or to bar their entry altogether, 
the States of the "Union are not!" Nor are the States free 
to deny extradition of a fugitive when a proper demand is 
made by the Executive of another State. 2u And the citizens 
in each State are entitled to all privileges and immunities of 
citizens in the several States.21 
Each of these provisions places a specific limitation on the 
sovereignty of the several States. Collectively they demon~ 
strate that ours is not a union of 50 wholly independent, 
sovereigns. But these provisions do not imply tha.t any one 
State's immunity from suit in the courts of another State is 
anything other than a matter of comity. Indeed, in viev.· of 
the Tenth Amendment's reminder that powers not delegated 
to the Federal Government nor prohibited to the States are 
reserved to the States or to the people.18 the existeuce of 
express limitations on state sovereignty may equally imply l 
that caution should be exercised before concluding that un~ 
stated limitations on state power were intended by the 
Framers. 
In the past, this Court has presumed that the States in-
tended to adopt policies of broad comity towards one another. 
But this presumption reflected an understanding of state 
policy, rather than a constitutional command. As this Court 
stated in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Peters 519, 590: 
"The intimate union of these states, as members of the 
same great politica.I family; the deep and vital interests 
is See U.S. Const., ArL I , § 
26 Id ., Art. IV, § 2. 
, : Ibid . 
,,, TIH• Tenth AmendmPnt to the United State:-; Con:s titution providPs: 
' 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibitf'rl by it to the State::;, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
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which bind them so closely together; should lead us, in 
the absence of proof to the contrary, to presume a greater 
degree of comity, allcl friendship , and kindness towards 
one another, than we should be authorized to presume 
betwf'en foreign nations. And when (as without doubt 
must occasionally happen) the interest or policy of any 
state requires it to restrict the rule . it has but to declare 
its will , and the legal presumption is at once at an end." 
Tn this case. California has "declared its will"; it has adopted 
as its policy full compensation in the cburts of its State for 
in.i uries on its high ways resulting from the negligence of 
others. whether those others be residents or nonresidents, 
agents of the State or private citizens. Nothing in the Fed-
eral Constitution authorizes or obligates this Court to frus-
trate that policy out of enforced respect for the sovereignty of 
Nevacla. 2 !1 
In this "Nation each sovereign governs only with the con-
sent of the governed. The people of Nevada have consented 
to a system in which their State is subject only to limited 
liability in tort. But the people of California. who have had 
no voice in Nevada's decision , have adopted a different sys-
tem. Each of these decisions is equally entitled to our respect. 
It may be wise policy. as a matter of harmonious interstate 
relations. for States to accord each other immunity or to 
respect any established limits on liability. They are free to 
do so. But if a federal court were to hold , by inference from 
the structure of our Constitution and nothing else. that 
California is not free in this case to enforce its policy of full 
compensation, that holding would constitute the real intru-
2'' ('f. Georr1ia v. C'halta11oooa. 26-! U. 8. 472, 480 ("L:rnd acquired b)' 
one Stat<> tn another State i:s held subject to the laws of t he latter and to 
all incident~ of private ownenship. The proprieta ry right of the owning 
State dors not rr~tnrt or modify the power of emine11 t domain of the-
tate where the la nd is situated ." ). 
- -
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sion on the sovereignty of the States-and the power of the 
people-in our Union. 
The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
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